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Explaining Variation in the Social Incorporation of Immigrants and the Second Generation in the United Kingdom

Abstract

What does the *social* incorporation among immigrants and the second generation look like? Using the *UK Household Longitudinal Study*, I show that taking a multidimensional view of one's social ties provides a more nuanced explanation of an immigrant's level of social incorporation across three different domains in the host country: familism, religiosity and political engagement. Hence, this study contributes to research on immigrant incorporation by: 1) considering social ties as the dependent, rather than the independent, variable of interest, shifting the focus to understanding how ethnic subgroup, socioeconomic, and demographic characteristics may affect the nature and intensity of social ties among immigrants and nonimmigrants, 2) considering multiple forms of social ties in tandem, and 3) taking a comparative approach to understanding incorporation by using four main groups in the analysis: native-born white, native-born nonwhite ("ethnic second generation children of immigrants"), white immigrants and nonwhite immigrants.

An individual's range of social ties is linked to economic outcomes because one gains access to other individuals' information and resources regarding the labor market (Granovetter, 1973; Portes and Sensenbrenner, 1993). Longitudinal analysis has shown that the greater the number of social contacts among immigrants, the higher their income and occupational status (Kanas et al., 2012). Hence, as one dimension of integration, examining social ties in particular can suggest potential long-run economic consequences for the well-being of immigrants and their offspring, as well as for the host country as a whole. In the United Kingdom, ethnic minorities' incorporation in particular remains a salient issue (Hatton, 2011), where just over 9% of the population are nonwhite ethnic minorities, with demographic projections suggesting an increasingly diverse national population in future years (Coleman, 2006).

Using data from Wave 1 (2009-2010) of the *UK Household Longitudinal Study,* a dataset with a significant oversample of immigrants and ethnic minorities, I have two research questions for this paper. First, what are the differences in social incorporation by race, nativity and immigrant subgroup? Second, how can these differences be explained given an individual's characteristics? Thus, this paper contributes to previous research on immigrant incorporation by: 1) considering social ties as the dependent, rather than the independent, variable of interest, shifting the focus to understanding how ethnic subgroup, socioeconomic, and demographic characteristics may affect the nature and intensity of social ties among immigrants and nonimmigrants, 2) taking a comparative approach to understanding incorporation by using the following four main groups in the analysis: native-born white, native-born nonwhite ("ethnic second generation children of immigrants"), white immigrants and nonwhite immigrants, and 3) considering multiple forms of social ties (familism, religiosity and political engagement) in tandem.

Motivation: Understanding The UK's Diverse Immigrant Population Through Social Incorporation

The UK's foreign-born population has historically been and continues to be diverse. The largest nonwhite ethnic minorities in the UK are Indians, Pakistanis, Black Caribbeans, Black Africans, and Bangladeshis (Dustmann and Theodoropoulos, 2010). These nonwhite immigrants arrived in the UK after World War II as labor migrants from former colonies, and are considered "New Commonwealth" immigrants. In addition, there have been significant streams of immigrants from "Old Commonwealth" countries (Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa). Both these groups respectively made up 20% and 17% of UK's net inflows of immigrants in 2002, while immigrants from EU countries made up another 17% (Vervotec, 2007).

However, with this diversity come different socioeconomic and demographic profiles. Analyses of labor market outcomes by immigrant subgroup shows that white foreigners are more successful than their nonwhite counterparts, even after controlling for individual characteristics (Dustmann et al., 2003). Moreover, even among nonwhite immigrants, there exists a "clear hierarchy, with Indians and Chinese at the top, Black Africans and Caribbeans somewhere lower down, and Pakistanis and Bangladeshis at the bottom" (Hammond 2011:296). Consequently, considering race and immigrant subgroup are important in understanding economic incorporation. However, considering whether these differences persist with respect to social incorporation can provide a more holistic view of immigrant and second generations' potential need and access to informal channels of support relative to the rest of the UK population.

In understanding variations in social incorporation, I specifically select familism, religiosity and political engagement for three reasons. First, the nature of involvement with respect to these three domains can be considered to be "accessible", with relatively few barriers for most individuals to develop these ties, if desired. Secondly, these ties can be considered "dynamically voluntary" over one's life. One's social ties may vary in type and intensity across the life course without the serious repercussions that can be associated with labor force or residential mobility decisions. In turn, my third reason is that I hypothesize these three domains to be jointly determined, and reflect a more complete picture of social incorporation. I elaborate on this interrelationship below.

Theoretical Background on Differences in Social Incorporation by Immigrant Subgroup
In this section I review the theoretical background on potential hypothesized differences in the social ties from three domains of support – familism, religiosity and political engagement – among native white British respondents, immigrants and second-generation ethnics. The presence of differences would suggest a lack of incorporation, while the absence of difference would provide evidence of incorporation.

Familism
The 2000 World Values Survey shows that only 89% of British respondents responded that family was "very important", compared to higher responses from individuals from India, Pakistan and the Bangladesh (93%, 93% and 97%, respectively) (Inglehart et al., 2004). Some scholars have attributed these differences to cultural arguments while others have found evidence supporting modernization arguments, where developed countries with comprehensive welfare systems have increased reliance on public assistance and accordingly decreased intrafamilial support (Coleman, 2006). Hence, current literature suggests that native-born populations in Western countries have relatively individualistic and detached parent-child relationships relative to immigrant populations who originate from non-Western countries (Foner and Dreby, 2011; Silverstein and Attias-Donfut, 2010).

One proxy for familism that has been used is the frequency of contact with one's mother, with higher levels of contact reflecting stronger familism. One expects immigrants to retain or "import" the family-based orientation upon arrival to the receiving country, but whether this familism, or contact with one's mother[1], remains stable or changes over time with further settlement may depend on a variety of factors such as time in the UK, socioeconomic status, and employment opportunities (Dustmann et al., 2003). Demographic characteristics such as age, marital status and whether one has children are also important factors. Given the different demographic profiles of immigrants and second-generation ethnics, who tend to have higher rates of fertility and are on average younger, this would suggest stronger ties with their mothers.

Religiosity
British individuals tend to be less religious, as results from the 2000 World Values survey find only 13% of them believe religion is "very important" (13%), compared to those from other non-

[1] Given differences in the potential geographic availability of kin among recent migrants, in this paper I consider contact with one's mother via email, telephone or letter, rather than face-to-face contact.
[2] Citizenship rights have frequently been cited as playing an important role in political engagement, but given that immigrants who are citizens from most Commonwealth countries can register to vote in all elections while those

Western countries such as India (57%), Pakistan (82%), Bangladesh (88%), various African countries (ranging from 70% to 93%) and even some Western countries like the US (57%) (Inglehart et al., 2004). Higher levels of religiosity have similar modernization arguments as familism, where a reliance on the church for social support has often declined with increased economic development, including government support.

One proxy for religiosity is frequency of participation at a religious organization, with at least weekly attendance reflecting strong religiosity. Given that most migration is economically motivated, immigrants may spend most of their time working and have constraints to participate in religious organizations. However, qualitative research indicates that some immigrants remain religious or become even more religious in the receiving country, as religious organizations provide an immediate source of social as well as material support for immigrants and other ethnic minorities (Ebaugh and Chafetz, 2000; Modood et al., 2003). Furthermore, if the religion is predominantly associated with specific ethnic minority groups, as is the case for Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, religious participation can preserve some elements of cultural life, and strengthen home country attachments.

Religiosity has also been shown to vary by demographic characteristics, based on marital status and presence of children in the home (De Vaus and McAllister, 1987), while age has generally been found to be positively correlated with orthodoxy. This suggests that immigrants and second-generation ethnics with high rates of marriage and fertility, such as Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, would have high religious participation.

Political Engagement

One proxy for political engagement that would reflect incorporation is party support. Party support or leaning indicates some awareness of domestic political issues. The socialization hypothesis states that recent immigrants would be expected to have lower levels of the receiving country's political engagement, but would increase with longer years of settlement and arrive at parity with the native-born population (Dancygier and Saunders, 2006; Saggar and Geddes, 2000)[2]. Socioeconomic and demographic characteristics may also play important roles in levels of various measures of political engagement, with higher socioeconomic status being positively related to political engagement (Hillygus 2005). Political participation has been found to vary by life cycle stage, albeit with mixed findings (Stoker and Jennings, 1995).

Interrelatedness of Familism, Religiosity and Political Engagement

There are multiple pathways in which familism, religiosity, and political engagement are related, although few studies investigate the possibility of a three-way relationship. As such, I discuss the pairwise relationships among familism, religiosity, and political engagement dimensions that have been most commonly cited in the literature.

Familism and religion have been positively associated with each other. Studies have examined both directions of the causal argument, where religiosity was found to strengthen mother-child

[2] Citizenship rights have frequently been cited as playing an important role in political engagement, but given that immigrants who are citizens from most Commonwealth countries can register to vote in all elections while those who are citizens from the EU are can vote in local elections (but are restricted from voting in UK Parliamentary general elections or referendums), I do not discuss citizenship rights here.

relationships (Peace and Axinn, 1998), as well as how parents transmit religiosity to their offspring (Myers, 1996). This may be even more relevant for immigrants and their second-generation children, where religion may further serve as avenues for the maintenance of cultural traditions and strengthening of ethnic identification through interactions with other coethnics.

Similarly, religiosity and political engagement have been shown to be positively associated through two separate mechanisms. Verba et al. (1995) argue that as other institutions such as school and religious organizations play prominent roles across the life course, participation in these organizations may generate civic skills amongst individuals and eventual increased politicization. Another complementary argument focuses on a different mechanism: the civic associational role of religious organizations in political matters via transmitting political information and recruitment for political activities (Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001). Both these arguments may be even more relevant for non-Christian individuals, such as Muslims in the UK. Despite many of the secular characterizations of the state, there still lacks a clear demarcation between "church and state", which has politicized religion. For example, Muslim schools have not received comparable levels of public funding as compared to Anglican schools. Therefore, there are direct political claims with tangible benefits arising out of one's religious affiliation, particularly for Pakistani and Bangladeshi Muslims.

Finally, familism and political engagement appear to have a negative relationship. Alesina and Giuliano (forthcoming) find an inverse relationship because "strong family ties appear to be a substitute for generalized trust, rather than a complement to it" (1). This finding is also supported by Wilcox (2004), who found that having a familistic orientation may deprioritize other forms of social interactions in service of immediate family members. Among individuals who are familistic and are part of an economically disadvantaged family, we would expect this relationship to hold.

Methodology

Analytic Plan

In order to answer my research questions, I examine two different dependent variables for my analysis: (i) the *number of strong social ties* and (ii) the *nature of strong social ties*. More specifically, I identified three domains of social ties – familism (contact with mother), religiosity (religious participation) and political engagement (support or feels closer to one political party) – and then further differentiated the social ties in each domain as being either "high" or "low" (the detailed operationalization is described in the subsection *Measures*).

Therefore, the first dependent variable, the *number of strong ties,* is a count variable ranging from zero to three, where zero reflects being "low" on familism, religiosity and political engagement, while three reflects being uniformly "high" in all three domains. The second dependent variable, the *nature of strong social ties*, reflects the different permutations of "high" versus "low" values across the three domains, resulting in an eight-category polytomous variable:

1) $F_{LOW}R_{LOW}P_{LOW}$ 2) $F_{LOW}R_{LOW}P_{HIGH}$ 3) $F_{LOW}R_{HIGH}P_{LOW}$ 4) $F_{LOW}R_{HIGH}P_{HIGH}$ 5) $F_{HIGH}R_{LOW}P_{LOW}$ 6) $F_{HIGH}R_{HIGH}P_{LOW}$ 7) $F_{HIGH}R_{LOW}P_{HIGH}$ 8) $F_{HIGH}R_{HIGH}P_{HIGH}$, where F=family ties, R=religious ties and P=political ties.

The analysis has two parts. The first part is a descriptive analysis. I will include descriptive

statistics for the overall sample by race and nativity, which support existing literature about the group-specific socioeconomic and demographic profiles of immigrants and second-generation ethnics. I will then examine the number and nature of strong social ties by nativity and race.

The second step consists of multivariate analyses using both ordinal and multinomial logistic regressions to more closely examine differences in the number and nature of strong ties, respectively, while controlling for nativity, race and immigrant subgroup. I will also compare the predicted versus observed probabilities for both dependent variables, based on the results of my final, best-fitting models.

Data

I investigate these questions using data from Wave 1 (2009-2010) of the *UK Household Longitudinal Study*, a face-to-face panel survey of a large representative sample of individuals in households in the UK. This dataset includes a significant number of minority ethnic groups within the main equal probability sample who lived in low-density ethnic areas, as well as a separate minority oversample of at least 1,000 adults from each of the five largest minority groups (Indians, Pakistanis, Bangladeshis, Caribbeans and Africans).

I restrict the analysis to respondents who are at least 25 years old and had a noncoresiding living mother. Only those who self-identified as a single race individual in one of the following racial categories are included: White, Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, Black Caribbean and Black African. I also use variables that represent the primary sampling unit and strata to account for the study's complex sampling design. All results are based on weighted data that has been adjusted for clustering, unless otherwise specified. Table 1 provides the distribution of respondents by nativity, race and immigrant subgroup.

Measures

Dependent Variables

Both dependent variables are based on an initial construction of three different dichotomous variables that reflected "high familism", "high religiosity" and "high political engagement". *High familism* relies on a question about the respondent's email/telephone/letter contact with his/her mother, which originally had six response categories. "Daily" or "once a week" responses were recoded as high. *High religiosity* relies on a question about the frequency of attending religious services, which originally had five response categories. Responses of "attends religious services or meetings at least once a week or more" were recoded as high. Finally, *high political engagement* relies on a combination of two questions about political support. Those who stated they "supported one political party" or "leaned closer to one party" were recoded as having high political engagement. The distribution of respondents by nativity and race across these eight categories is provided in Table 3.

Independent Variables

The key independent variables in this analysis are nativity, race, and immigrant subgroup. *Nativity* is based on a question as to whether one was born in the UK, with those born outside the UK classified as foreign-born while those born in the UK are native-born. *Race* is based on a question that is parallel to the one posed in the UK Census which asks one to self-identify their ethnicity based on 18 different groups. Those who identified as "White" or "British / English /

Scottish / Welsh / Northern Irish" were grouped as being "White" while those who identified as "Indian", "Pakistani", "Bangladeshi", "Caribbean" or "African" were classified as "Nonwhite". Immigrant subgroup is based on a combination of race and place of birth. For nonwhite respondents, each one of the five nonwhite ethnic classifications represents a different ethnic subgroup, resulting in five dummy variables. For those who were classified as "white" but were born outside the UK, ethnic subgroup was based on place of birth. White foreigners from European countries were classified as "EU foreign-born", while those white respondents from Old Commonwealth countries were classified as "Old Commonwealth Foreign-Born".

I also control for age, sex, being employed, being married, having any children, having at least an A-level education and gross monthly household income in my analysis. Table 2 provides the descriptive statistics by nativity and race. More detailed descriptive statistics by immigrant subgroup will be provided in the final paper.

Next Steps

Table 3 provides the weighted distributions of respondents' number and nature of social ties for native-born whites, native-born nonwhites, foreign-born whites and foreign-born nonwhites. It is clear that a higher proportion of nonwhites, regardless of whether they were born in the UK or abroad, have at least two strong social ties, compared to whites. Much of this difference can be accounted for by a larger percentage of respondents in two categories: those were uniformly high on all three indicators, at 11% and 15% respectively, compared to only 3% of whites, as well as those who indicated high familism and high religiosity, at 10% and 18%, while 2% of native-born whites and 7% of foreign-born whites were classified in this group.

I will discuss and further examine these differences as described in my analytic plan above. I will also consider life cycle variation as additional independent variables in explaining these differences. Given the preliminary work that has already been conducted, I am on target to complete a full version of this paper by March 2013.

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Table 1. Distribution of Analytic Sample By Nativity, Race and Immigrant Subgroup (N=18,552)

Variable	%	N
Group		
Native-Born White	87.37	14,371
Foreign-Born White Other	3.06	485
Foreign-Born White European	3.13	516
Foreign-Born White Old Commonwealth	0.95	157
Foreign-Born Indian	1.53	630
Foreign-Born Pakistani	0.75	416
Foreign-Born Bangladeshi	0.28	386
Foreign-Born Carribean	0.33	203
Foreign-Born African	1.06	576
Second-Generation Indian	0.61	239
Second-Generation Pakistani	0.35	190
Second-Generation Bangladeshi	0.05	57
Second-Generation Carribean	0.42	262
Second-Generation African	0.11	64

Notes: Weighted using individual weights.

Table 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables By Nativity and Race (N=18,552) *

	Native-Born White		Native-Born Nonwhite		Foreign-Born White		Foreign-Born Nonwhite	
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	Mean	SD
Age	41.81	0.10	36.34	0.29	38.06	0.31	38.79	0.28
Male	0.42		0.35		0.41		0.46	
Employed	0.78		0.72		0.80		0.68	
Married	0.56		0.64		0.54		0.74	
Has Any Children	0.77		0.76		0.62		0.79	
At Least A-Level Education	0.89		0.96		0.90		0.84	
Gross Monthly Household Income	3795.28	28.74	3637.75	149.94	4284.95	119.58	3284.42	87.47
N	14,371		812		1,158		2,211	

Notes: Weighted using individual weights. No standard deviations are presented for dichotomous variables. See text for an explanation.

Table 3. Distribution of Social Ties By Nativity and Race (N=18,552) *

	Native-Born White	Native-Born Nonwhite	Foreign-Born White	Foreign-Born Nonwhite
% With No Strong Social Ties	10.0%	6.1%	12.0%	7.1%
% High on One Strong Social Tie				
Total	47.8%	38.6%	50.5%	36.7%
Familism	38.5%	31.4%	40.5%	25.7%
Religiosity	0.5%	1.7%	1.1%	4.1%
Political Engagement	8.8%	5.5%	8.9%	6.9%
% High on Two Strong Social Ties				
Total	39.0%	44.8%	34.4%	40.8%
Familism & Religiosity	2.1%	10.2%	6.9%	17.8%
Religiosity & Political Engagement	0.7%	2.5%	0.7%	6.6%
Familism & Political Engagement	36.2%	32.1%	26.7%	16.5%
% High on All Three Strong Social Ties	3.3%	10.5%	3.2%	15.4%
N	14,371	812	1,158	2,211

Notes: Weighted using individual weights.