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Educational Assortative Repartnering After Divorce. A Competing Risks Analysis Using a Large Survey In Flanders (Belgium)

*****First Draft Version*****

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Abstract

Higher order unions are playing an increasingly important part in family life. Still, even if there is a large literature on educational assortative mating in first unions, similar research on matching in higher order unions is scarce or dated. Research about educational assortative mating patterns gives insight into factors of attractiveness on the remarriage market and is relevant for understanding and predicting the reproduction, and maybe reinforcement, of social inequality after divorce. Using data from divorced men and women in Flanders (Belgium), we examine if higher order unions are more or less homogamous than first marriages and how the patterns observed among first marriages influence the ones in higher order unions. Our first results, based on competing risks event history models, indicate that people tend to reproduce the pattern observed for their first marriage in their higher order unions. We do not find evidence of higher order unions being "more conservative" than first marriages.

Introduction

Due to the increase in the number of divorces – in Belgium, the divorce risk quadrupled during the last three decades – higher order unions are playing an increasingly important part in Belgian family life. While the number of first marriages (for both partners) continues to decrease since 1970, the amount of remarriages almost doubled. Nowadays, in one third of the marriages at least one partner has already been married. At the same time, the marriage propensity of divorced people has fallen sharply: between 1970 and 2000, the proportion of divorced persons who remarried is halved (Corijn, 2005; Mortelmans & Pasteels, 2011). Unmarried cohabitation with a new partner after a first divorce, as a permanent alternative to a new marriage or as a prelude of a new marriage, has gained

popularity (Bumpass & Sweet, 1989; Cherlin, 1992; Corijn, 2005; Lodewijckx, 2008). This paper investigates patterns of higher order union formation. More specific, we focus on patterns of educational assortative mating after divorce, whether or not influenced by the educational assortative mating patterns in first marriage. *Are people's partner choices in first marriages reproduced by the partner choices made in their second unions? Do divorced people choose an educationally more similar or dissimilar partner than their first marriage partner was?*

Research about repartnering patterns in Belgium remains very rare (Corijn, 2005). Yet, knowledge of the reasons why people enter a new union or not can be important for several reasons (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Shafer, 2009). Entering a new union, for instance, might fulfill the need for love and companionship. Feelings of loneliness and deteriorated well-being are very common for people whose first marriage ended. Remarriage may be a way of coping with this. Similarly, for many men and women a new marriage may represent an important route out of poverty (Amato, 2000; de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Sweeney, 1997). International research has indicated that repartnering is a selective process; among the divorced, some are more likely to remarry or recohabit than others. Differences across age, gender, race/ethnicity, parental status, educational attainment, labor force status and income have already frequently been identified (Bumpass, Sweet, & Castro Martin, 1990; de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; de Jong Gierveld, 2004; Jansen, Mortelmans, & Snoeckx, 2009; Matthijs, 1987; Pasteels, Corijn, & Mortelmans, 2012; Sweeney, 1997; Wu & Schimmele, 2005). Needs, attractiveness and opportunity in social, economical and cultural terms are the three most mentioned arguments why people enter a new union after divorce (Becker, 1981; de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Oppenheimer, 1988).

Additional insights into factors of attractiveness on the remarriage market, can be provided by investigating questions around assortative mating, or *'who (re)marries whom?'* (Shafer, 2009). The degree of similarity between spouses from higher order unions in terms of age, educational attainment, religious background, parental status, marital history, income, occupational status and social class is widely documented in the Anglo-Saxon countries (Dean & Gurak, 1978; Goldscheider & Sassler, 2006; Jacobs & Furstenberg, 1986; Mueller & Pope, 1980; Ní Brolchaín, 1988; Ono, 2005; Shafer, 2009; Whyte, 1990; Wu & Schimmele, 2005) and partly in the Netherlands (Gelissen, 2004; Ivanova & Kalmijn, 2012; van Leeuwen & Maas, 2007), but is completely lacking in Belgium. How individual factors are associated with patterns of educational assortative mating in the remarriage market, is until now, as far as we know, only explored in an American study. Shafer (2009) tried to identify whether second marriages follow a more contemporary homogamous pattern or a more traditional form where men marry less-educated and younger women. His findings support the latter: while educational and age homogamy are more likely in first marriage (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Schwartz & Mare, 2005), heterogamy seems to be the norm in second marriage. Some of his

conclusions could have been different if he had also included analyses for cohabitation after divorce. So, when investigating higher order union formation patterns after divorce in this paper, we will compare patterns of assortative mating in informal unmarried recohabitation with patterns in formal remarriage.

Sociological research on partner choices is also relevant for understanding and predicting the reproduction of social inequality (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Breen & Andersen, 2012; Mare, 1991; Press, 2004). Rates of homogamy are a reflection of the boundaries that currently separate groups in society, but reveal at the same time the potential existence of interaction across group boundaries. In recent decades, people seem to prefer to a large extent marrying a partner within their group, so with the similar social origin and with the same characteristics. An increase in homogamy can therefore imply a rise in social differences between couples and families in modern societies (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Kalmijn, 1998). By investigating our research questions, we can get an indication of *intra*generational mobility or stability in partner choices over the life course (before and after first marriage dissolution). If current unions are less likely to be homogamous than first unions (the marriage market hypothesis), divorced men and women cross boundaries by remarrying or starting a new relationship with someone that does not have the same characteristics as their former partner. If people's current unions are more homogamous than their first unions (the learning-hypothesis), divorced men and women adjust their preferences towards a partner who is more similar to them than their first partner and will search for a partner within their group. Individuals who already have been married homogamously the first time will not change their preferences and continue their search for 'the ideal partner' within their group to (Dean & Gurak, 1978; Gelissen, 2004). People that are 'divorce-prone' (the remarrying kind hypothesis) make the same heterogamous matches over and over and therefore stay very stable during their life-course.

In this contribution, the research question about educational assortative mating patterns through someone's life course will be investigated using data of the *Divorce in Flanders*-survey (Mortelmans et al., 2011). Data from the Belgian survey of the *Generations and Gender Programme* will be used to provide insight in how the remarriage market is educationally distributed. The focus on education is justified by the fact that (1) educational attainment is one of the most important determinants of occupational success in industrialized societies and (2) it helps researchers to understand how cultural resources influence individual's preferences for specific partners (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003).

Theory and Previous Research

Gender-Specific Needs, Preferences and Opportunities and Their Changes

Most theories and hypotheses about marriage or union formation assume that people remain single or not upon their needs, preferences and opportunities. The need for economic security, affection or company, depending on the resources available to an individual, is supposed to be an important factor in people's desire for a partnership. The greater the need, the more likely it is that a person will enter a partnership. Preferences, or how attractive a person is to the opposite sex, and opportunities to meet potential partners are more indicators of people's "marriageability" (Goldscheider & Waite, 1986: 94). Unattractiveness and marriage market constraints traditionally lower the probability and timing of marrying (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Dykstra & Poortman, 2010; Lewis & Oppenheimer, 2000).

In a gender traditional society, where marriage patterns reflect specialization in sex roles (Becker, 1981), low-resource women and high-resource men are supposed to face high economic benefits and low economic costs in union formation (Dykstra & Poortman, 2010). According to Gary Becker's (1981) "gains to trade" model, union formation is only beneficial if the perceived gains to marriage are positive, and if both partners believe they are better off together than single. Although his theory is in principal gender neutral, it is usually argued that the gains from marriage will be the highest where men and women follow a traditional sex-based division of labor because the gender roles are inherently complementary. Historically, men were expected to benefit from their wives, since women were expected to engage in domestic labor and to be orientated in raising children. Women, on the other hand, counted on benefiting from their husbands, since men had to focus on outside employment and the economic well-being of the family. As a result, traditional marriage formation meant that a good education is particularly important for men, since a man with greater occupational success will make a more desirable "trading partner". Men's ability to attract a mate should therefore be positively related to their socioeconomic prospects (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Dykstra & Poortman, 2010; Sweeney, 1997). Under Becker's framework, husbands have the greatest advantage if their wives resemble themselves as much as possible in all their personal traits (intelligence, health, education, social origin, race etc.). Yet, the need of a wife as "homemaker" makes men prefer women with low labor market orientation (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003).

Choosing a desirable partner is, however, constrained by the size and composition of the available pool of potential partners (England & Farkas, 1986; Guttentag & Secord, 1983; Oppenheimer, 1988). In a society with a gender-based division of labor, only some men are structurally possible to find women with the same level of education, since there are on average

more highly educated men than women. Highly educated women and low educated men, on the opposite, have, besides the lower gains from marriage, also restricted opportunities to enter a union: highly educated women have to compete with their female counterparts who have not invested too much in career resources and low educated men have to compete against all higher educated men. In sum, Becker's gender-traditional model, suggests a tendency towards male educational hypogamy (men marrying educationally downwards) and female educational hypergamy (women marrying educationally upwards) (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Blossfeld, 2009).

Changed attitudes and values regarding gender roles, suggest that economic prospects for both men and women have become important to union formation. Women's increased educational levels and attachment to a work career make several authors (Kalmijn, 1994; Oppenheimer, 1988, 1997; Press, 2004; Raley & Bratter, 2004; Sweeney & Cancian, 2004; Sweeney, 2002) believe that high-resource women become more attractive candidates to men. Now that the continuous gainful employment of wives becomes more normal and the necessity for a second income to meet changed consumption patterns has risen, the wife's income becomes a significant determinant to reduce the financial risks in a dual-earner family (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003; Dykstra & Poortman, 2010). Consequently, women's achieved socioeconomic status rather than more traditional characteristics such as religion, social background and physical attractiveness should increase their chances to be evaluated as a good potential spouse (Kalmijn, 1991; Oppenheimer, 1988). This change in preferences, together with the educational expansion, may also have implications for assortative mating. Oppenheimer (1988) suggests that the tendency for both men and women to remain attached to a work career increases the likelihood that men and women with similar educational levels will meet in the labor market and form relationships. Blossfeld and Timm (2003) assume that the structurally increased chance of meeting a partner with the same qualification in the educational system should raise the level of educational homogamy, and specifically reduce educational hypogamy of men across cohorts. The relatively age-graded logic of educational systems in modern societies, they argue, creates increasingly homogeneous groups with rising age and therefore produces a structurally increased likelihood of establishing a social relationship with a similarly qualified partner which can be a possible first marriage partner (see also Kalmijn & Flap, 2001).

Literature of the last two decades on educational assortative mating in first marriages indicates that people seem to be inherently prone to educational homogamy, combined with male hypogamy and female hypergamy. Women have the tendency to marry men at least as highly educated as themselves; men tend to marry women who are at most as highly educated as themselves (Blossfeld, 2009; Esteve, Garcia, & Permanyer, 2011; Kalmijn, 1994, 1998; Mare, 1991; Rose, 2004; Schoen & Cheng, 2006; Schwartz & Mare, 2012; Van Bavel, 2012). International comparative research found evidence that the degree of educational homogamy is (nonlinear)

related to the level of economic development: as the level of development increases, educational homogamy seems to increase too, subsequently peaks, and then decreases. Such results imply empirical evidence for the existence of a trend towards more openness in industrial societies (Smits, Ultee, & Lammers, 1998, 2000; Ultee & Luijkx, 1990). Yet, social closure among the higher educated tends to remain strong, even in most modern societies (Smits & Park, 2009; Smits, 2003). These observed patterns are compatible with the above mentioned gender-specific preferences and marriage market opportunities and their changes. Since the mid-1990's, however, the gender gap in higher education in favor of men has reversed: now more women than men participate in higher education and obtain more degrees (Vincent-Lancrin, 2008). Therefore, some researchers expect that the old pattern of female educational hypergamy and male hypogamy will weaken (Esteve et al., 2011; Van Bavel, 2012).

Gender Differences and Educational Assortative Mating in the Repartnering Market

De Graaf and Kalmijn (2003) argue that economic and sociological theories of marriage, usually applied to first marriage formation and stability, may be better tested on remarriage data or repartnering data in general. While first marriage is primarily a matter of "when", remarriage is also and above all a matter of "if", especially for people who divorce at later ages. So, since many economic hypotheses are more specified to the occurrence of marriage than to its timing (Oppenheimer, 1997), applications to remarriage may provide a novel and stronger way to test such theories. Their study, based on data from the 1998 survey on *Divorce in The Netherlands*, seem to lower the importance of economic arguments based on sex-role specialization and financial needs for marriage formation. Novel and stronger support was found for cultural theories and social theories that emphasize the role of meeting and mating opportunities. Women with individualistic orientations, for example, have a higher risk to cohabit than marry after divorce. Religiosity decreases the risk to cohabit after divorce for both men and woman, but has no effect on the risk to remarry. Working and being actively integrated in society (to participate at outside domestic activities) also increases men and women's risk to repartner, and by this confirms De Graaf and Kalmijn's (2003) hypothesis that the level of social integration is a fundamental prerequisite for meeting and mating with new partners. After divorce, people are faced with a marriage market that is more restricted than the market that they faced when they were young. This is not only because they are generally older and the number of single people at later ages in limited, but also because divorced people are naturally less integrated in typical marriage markets such as schools, voluntary associations, and leisure locations (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Jappens, Wijckmans, & Van Bavel, 2011; Kalmijn, 1998).

Still, finding a new partner after a divorce is, like in a first marriage market and maybe even more, constrained by the opportunity to form a desirable match. Highly educated or well-paid men and childless, young women are supposed to have the largest pools available to them. High-resource, previously-married men may be attractive marriage partners because they have the ability to support a family. Their normally older age can enhance their attractiveness because of the more established careers and conspicuous economic status than never-married men (Hughes, 2000; Shafer, 2009; Sweeney, 1997). Shafer (2009) assumes that the socioeconomic status of women should have a negative impact or no impact on the likelihood of remarriage. Unlike as in a contemporary marriage market, where men view women's economic status as important, divorced men may have a preference for traditional matches with younger and less-educated women who are committed to domestic labor (South, 1991). While women in most cases suffer from a decreasing level of prosperity following a divorce, men often experience an increase in their economic well-being (Andreß, Borgloh, Bröckel, Giesselmann, & Hummelsheim, 2006; Jansen et al., 2009; Peterson, 1996). So, divorced men with a high post-divorce status may have a lower economic need to marry highly educated women, who often opt out of their traditional domestic labor roles (Oppenheimer, 1997), and a higher need for a spouse to take care of children (Goldscheider & Sassler, 2006). This view implies that especially highly-educated women suffer from a disadvantage in the remarriage market. An alternative perspective suggests that educational attainment neither benefits nor hurts women in the remarriage market because they are particularly evaluated on non-economic characteristics (Goldscheider & Sassler, 2006; Shafer, 2009; Wu & Schimmele, 2005). Previous recent research has, however, found mixed results about the association between educational attainment and repartnering for both men and women: sometimes no correlation for both sexes (Dewilde & Uunk, 2008; Meggiolaro & Ongaro, 2008; Skew, Evans, & Gray, 2009; Xu, Hudspeth, & Bartkowski, 2006), otherwise a positive correlation for both sexes (Pasteels et al., 2012: only in a specific divorce cohort; Wu & Schimmele, 2005) and sometimes only a positive correlation for men (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Poortman, 2007; Shafer, 2009).

Differences in age (at separation) and parental status may be considered as more important factors in how constrained divorced women are in their opportunities and choices on the remarriage market (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Shafer, 2009). Despite the fact that joint-custody arrangements are on the rise (Sodermans, Vanassche, & Matthijs, 2011), women are still more likely to stay the primary caregiver to children after divorce (Goldscheider & Sassler, 2006; Hughes, 2000; Ono, 2005). Financial circumstances, a lack of social integration and the extra complexity that children bring in a new relationship may subsequently have a stronger impact on a divorced mother's need and possibility to find a new partner than on a divorced father's need and possibility (Beaujouan, 2012; de Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Lampard & Peggs, 1999; Poortman, 2007; Shafer, 2009; Skew et al., 2009;

Sweeney, 1997). As mentioned before, the availability of potential partners can depend on an individual's age. It is assumed that the older men and women are at separation, and the more time they spend in the remarriage market, the fewer and fewer marriage partners there will be available in the partner pool (De Graaf & Kalmijn, 2003; Gelissen, 2004; Lewis & Oppenheimer, 2000). The importance of age for especially women can be demonstrated by the following: even women without children may draw from a smaller partner pool than men do, because men traditionally show a preference for and often marry women younger than themselves (England & Farkas, 1986; Oppenheimer, 1988; South, 1991), also after divorce. Thus, divorced women encounter also compositional disadvantages such as unbalanced sex ratios at older ages, which can reduce the probability of remarriage (De Jong Gierveld, 2004; Gelissen, 2004; Shafer, 2009).

If men and women in the remarriage market are evaluated on more traditional characteristics, educationally homogamous matches after divorce may be less likely. Shafer's (2009) results, based on an American panel study (NLSY79) beginning in 1979 and with available data until 2006, seem to confirm this. For men, he found that a high social status (operationalized by having a high income in a given year) is associated with a higher likelihood of remarrying less-educated women compared to remarrying homogamously. A woman's educational assortative mating pattern after divorce, on the other hand, was in his analysis not significantly influenced by her socioeconomic status (measured as being in a full-time, year-round employment in a given year). As a whole, his findings showed that remarriage patterns are more traditional than contemporary first marriage patterns: men have the tendency to make traditional matches by remarrying younger and less-educated women; women's remarriage prospects and marital sorting outcomes are strongly influenced by age and social background characteristics, such as mother's education and family structure. Other research questioning the issue of how individual characteristics are associated with educational assortative mating patterns after divorce is unknown to us.

Several studies, on the contrary, have already focused on the degree of homogamy and heterogamy in women and men's new relationships after divorce, compared with the degree in their first marriages. Most of these studies test implicit or explicit the following competing hypotheses. The *learning hypothesis* states that a "mismatch" between a bride and a groom (a social heterogamous marriage) can be a source of conflict that sometimes may turn into a divorce. Divorced people learn from this - is the thought - and become rather choosy the second time around. More specifically, they go on the remarriage market with their new knowledge and search for a partner who is more similar to them than their first partner was. A more homogamous new relationship should, according to their beliefs, lead to increased benefits and less conflict. Individuals, whose first marriage was already quite homogamous, will not change their preferences in favor of a partner with dissimilar characteristics (Dean & Gurak, 1978; Duberman, 1975; Gelissen, 2004; van

Leeuwen & Maas, 2007; Whyte, 1990). The *learning-hypothesis* only holds if the marriage market does not restrict individuals in the realization of their adjust preferences. Yet, the *marriage market hypothesis* emphasizes that the second marriage market is more heterogeneous, and by this more restricted in the realization of finding a similar partner, than the first marriage market. The diverse, but smaller pool of potential mates implies that divorcees probably select a mate that is more dissimilar to them. Higher order unions are therefore likely to be less homogamous than first marriages (Dean & Gurak, 1978; Gelissen, 2004; Hirschman & Matras, 1971; van Leeuwen & Maas, 2007). The third and last hypothesis, the *remarrying kind hypothesis* or the *risk seeker hypothesis* suppose that some people are more prone to enter into unstable marriages than others. Even after a divorce, these persons do not learn from their experiences in the sense that they cannot or do not want to change their preferences. According to the "divorce prone" argument, people who are inclined to marry heterogamously and have unstable relationships the first time are also inclined to form heterogamous relationships after divorce (Dean & Gurak, 1978; van Leeuwen & Maas, 2007).

Somewhat older studies concerning educational assortative mating patterns before and after divorce, have not yet found much evidence for the *learning*- and *marriage market hypothesis*. One study (Dean & Gurak, 1978) found support for the 'divorce proneness' of certain women; other research (Jacobs & Furstenberg, 1986; Whyte, 1990) found that remarried women do not resemble their new husbands more or less than their first husbands. More recent findings with respect to educational homogamy by John Gelissen (2004), support the *learning-hypothesis* for remarried men, but not for remarried women. Nevertheless, he suggest that the significantly stronger association for men between their level of education and that of their new partner than that of their former partner, may be the result of the remarriage market becoming more favorable for men to find a new partner more similar to them than their first partner was.

Most research on assortative mating patterns made use of a log-linear analysis of the global contingency table that contains the observed frequencies in the joint distribution of variables measuring spousal characteristics to examine and compare the degree of association within people's first and current union. Our primary goal is not to compare the degree of educational sorting between first and second unions, but how the partner choice made in first marriage influence the partner choice after divorce. Therefore we will use event history models, instead of log-linear models. Next, we do not want the educational sorting outcome like 'homogamous', 'heterogamous downwards' or 'heterogamous upwards' already incorporated in the dependent variable (c.f. Shafer, 2009). Otherwise we are not able to compare mating patterns per educational level, and by this we avoid the problem that low and highly educated men and women cannot repartner respectively downwards and upwards.

Finally, in many studies, researchers do refer to possible marriage market constraints when discussing their results, but do not take a closer look in how the marriage market actually conditions the choices divorced people make when repartnering. For this reason, we will try to create a measure that takes possible marriage market constraints into account, and that can be included in our event history models. Data from the Belgian survey of the *Generations and Gender Programme* seemed, so far, the best data to get an idea of how constrained divorced people are to make their most desirable partner choice on the remarriage market.

Empirical Analysis

Data and Methods

In our study, we use mainly data from the multi-actor and multi-method survey *Divorce in Flanders* (DiF) (Pasteels, Mortelmans, & Van Bavel, 2011), collected during the period September 2009 - December 2010. Overall, almost 12 110 of the 26 376 persons contacted could be questioned about a broad range of sociological, demographical, social-psychological, social-epidemiological, economical and juridical issues related to marriage and divorce, which represents a total response rate of 46%. The target population of the Dif-study consisted of individuals who were involved in a legal marriage that fulfilled all of the following criteria: the legal marriage should have taken place between 01/01/1971 and 31/12/2008; for both man and woman, the reference marriage was their first marriage; both partners were at least 18 years old and maximum 40 years old and domiciled in the Flemish region when the marriage was sealed; husband and wife had the Belgian nationality since birth and each partner in the reference marriage could have experienced only one legal divorce. Through computer-assisted personal interviews, the DiF-consortium was able to collect information about 6470 (ex-) partners: 1811 respondents were still in their first marriage and 4659 respondents had experienced a divorce. Together, they represent 4550 marriages, from which 3525 are and 1025 are not dissolved. Besides both (ex-) partners, also a parent of each (ex-) partner, a common child and a possible new partner of divorced partners, were if possible questioned through a written questionnaire or web survey.

In this contribution, we will work with the marriages dissolved between 1980 and 2005. We make an additional selection of the divorced respondents who, at the time of the interview, were still in their first post-divorce relationship or did not start a new relationship yet. People who remarried with a second or third partner after divorce, or people who were in an unmarried cohabitation with a partner who was not their first partner after divorce, will not be included in our analyses. We did not

select them because we only have the educational level of the current partner available and not the educational level of every new partner after divorce. This additional selection criterion can cause possible sample selection bias, as the result form attrition through divorce or separation of second unions. Because the respondents could only have experienced one legal divorce at most, and because homogamy is positively related to marital success (Janssen, 2002; Schwartz & Han, 2012; Schwartz, 2010), the sample selection criterion mentioned would imply that heterogamous remarriages or unmarried cohabitations are underrepresented in our sample. Furthermore, we have to mention that some of the selected divorced respondents belong to the same dissolved reference marriage. Problems related to dependency between observations are, however, minimized by doing analyses for men and women separately. (To completely avoid such clustering issues, we will try to estimate 'cluster-robust standard errors'; not yet presented in this paper.)

To examine our research questions, we apply discrete-time event history methods to estimate models for the transition to a new unmarried cohabitation and/or second marriage. Because of the fact that we are especially interested in educational assortative mating patterns, we will use a special case of the discrete-time logit model. Discrete-time multinomial logistic regression (Allison, 1982) allows us to take the educational degree of the new partner into account and to track how assortative mating changes with additional time in the repartnering market. To estimate the models, we constructed two person-month files. Every file contains records for each respondent for each month, beginning in the month of the year in which the respondent stopped living with his or her former partner, and ending in the month of a certain year in which the person first started living together or remarried. The maximum exposure in every person-month file is 240 months: respondents that remained single during a period of 20 years after separation were being right censored. The final subsample of recohabiting consists of 161778 person-month lines of which 68848 belong to men and 92930 belong women (N_{men}=1133 and N_{women}=1351). The final subsample of remarrying consist of 271729 person-month lines of which 124018 belong to men and 147711 belong women (N_{men}=1145 and N_{women}=1356). Making these two separate person-month files has an important artifact. People at risk to recohabit, can still remarry after they recohabited and people at risk to remarry are most of the time also have been at risk to recohabit unmarried. So in most of the cases, the person-months observed before recohabitation are a subset of the person-months observed before remarrying. We chose to model both cohabitation and remarriage separately because we suspect that the analysis may reveal different aspects of relationship formation after divorce.

In order to get an indication of (re)marriage market constraints, we will make use of the Belgian survey of the *Generations and Gender Programme* (GGP). This large-scale and representative survey was organized during the period 2008-2010 and is part of an international research project by

the United Nations (UNECE) that is aimed to study the evolutions of relationships between men and women on the one hand and between different generations on the other hand. The realized sample for the Flemish region consists of 1860 men and 2000 women. For each of these men and women, we were able to determine which partner status they had in every month after their 18th birthday: he or she (1) has had never a partner before, (2) has no partner after a breakup, (3) has no partner after widowhood, (4) is in a first cohabiting relationship, (5) is in a first marriage, (6) is in a second or higher order cohabiting union or (7) is in a second or higher order marriage. We chose to limit the observation period from 01/01/1980 until 01/12/2007 and calculated the amount of singles from 25 to 50 years old in every month within this period by a summation of the men and women in partner status 1, 2 and 3. The latter is visualized by the lexis diagram in Figure 1. We are aware of the fact that we do not reach the whole remarriage market by these age barriers. After all, men and women can also get into a divorce and end up on the repartnering market before they are 25 years old or after they are 50 years old. Still, only a small proportion of the respondents in the DiF-survey divorced and repartnered before or after the ages 25-50. The choice of both age barriers can also be justified by the following arguments: by the age of 25, most individuals achieved their final educational level; since the oldest person in the Belgian GGP-data was born in 1928, he or she could only have reached the age of 52 in 1980, so a higher age barrier was unfortunately not an option. If we would have increased the upper age barrier till 60, or even 55, we would not be able to calculate the number of singles within the same age range in every month during the period 01/01/1980 - 01/12/2007. We wanted to start the observation period in 1980 because the DiF-respondents included in our subsamples married since 1971 and divorced since 1980. The choice of 2007 as upper limit is the result of practical considerations: as the GGP-data were collected during the period 2008-2010, we have the complete relationship-histories of all the GGP-respondents until 01/12/2007. The results and further operationalization of the GGP-data, as well as the operationalization of all other covariates, will be described in the following section.

FIGURE 1. Lexis diagram of the analyzed GGP-data



Measurement Instruments

Educational sorting outcome in the dependent variables. We incorporated the educational level of the new partner as a characteristic of the union selected; an unmarried cohabitation or a second marriage. In the relationship histories module, respondents were asked to sum up every relationship that lasted at least 3 months since their first marriage. If the last specified relationship did not end yet, the highest obtained qualification of the current partner was also questioned. Every question about someone's highest obtained qualification in the DiF-survey was inspired by the International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED), designed by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNIZO) in the early 1970's. We divided the possible educational outcomes into 3 categories so that a low educational level corresponds to the ISCED-codes 0-2, a medium educational level to the ISCED-codes 3-4 and a high educational level to the ISCED-codes 5-6 (see Table 1 for an overview).

Subdividing unions into two types (marital vs. cohabiting) and taking account of the educational level of the new partner creates two dependent variables with each 4 possible

outcomes: (1) remaining single/unmarried, (2) recohabit/remarry with a man or women of the lowest educational level category (completed lower secondary education), (3) recohabit/remarry with a man or women of the medium educational level category (completed upper secondary education) and (4) recohabit/remarry with a man or women of the highest educational level category (completed tertiary education).

TABLE 1. ISCED 1997 classification

ISCED-code	Name of the level	DiF- and GGP-outcome
0	Pre-primary education	Low educated
1	Primary education	
2	Lower secondary education	
3	Upper secondary education	Medium educated
4	Post-secondary non tertiary education	
5	First stage of tertiary education (Bachelor)	Highly educated
6	Second stage of tertiary education (Master)	

Source: UNESCO, 2006

***Duration and time*.** Of every reported relationship of more than 3 months' duration, we know when he started and possibly ended, but also whether or not and when the respondent start living and/or married with the respectively new partner. Due to this dates, we could calculate the exact time (in months) between the *de facto* separation and the new cohabitation, second marriage or time of interview. In both the analyses for cohabiting and remarrying, we included a set of dichotomous time variables to model duration dependency. By this *piecewise constant hazard* approach (Blossfeld & Rohwer, 2002), we allow the hazard of repartnering to be different in the following 7 time intervals: (1) from the same month in which the respondent got separated till the 12^{th} month after separation (reference category), (2) from the 13^{th} till the 24^{th} month, (3) from the 25^{th} till the 36^{th} month, (4) from the 37^{th} till the 48^{th} month, (5) from the 49^{th} month till the 84^{th} month, (6) from the 85^{th} till the 120^{th} month and (7) from the 121^{th} till the 240^{th} month. We made a separate category of every year of the first three years after separation, because then the hazard differentiates the most. In the DiF-dataset, some men and women reported to live already with their new partner even before the stated date of *de facto* separation: those respondents were recoded as being recohabited in the same month of separation.

Men's and women's age has already frequently been considered as an important factor for repartnering. In our analyses, an indication of age is measured through a time-constant variable 'age at separation', divided into 3 categories: (1) younger than 31, (2) between 31 and 40 years old and (3) 41 years old or more. In order to control for changes across time, we constructed a time-constant variable 'divorce cohort', also divided into 3 categories: (1) separated in the period 1980-1989, (2)

separated in the period 1990-1999 and (3) separated in the period 2000-2005. Both time variables were operationalized as a set of dichotomous variables with the first category as the reference category.

Socioeconomic status. Patterns of educational sorting after divorce can only be studied if also the respondent's educational level is included in the event-history models. A set of dichotomous time-constant variables were created from his or her highest obtained qualification on time of interview; categorized like the educational level of the current partner (with low educated as reference category); and considered as a measure of someone's long-term socioeconomic status.

Income at any given point-in-time would be the most ideal measure of current socioeconomic status. However, we only have the net monthly income available of the last month before the interview. We do have information about someone's type of activity at any point-in-time: respondents were asked to distinguish and sum up every period of full-time work, part-time work and unemployment. By this detailed information, we could make the set of time-varying dichotomous variables which indicates that the respondent (1) works/worked full-time (95% or more), (2) works/worked part-time (less than 95%) or (3) is/was unemployed (reference category).

First marriage ties and characteristics. Having children from a first marriage are supposed to have a strong effect on the opportunity to repartner, especially for women. Therefore, we included the respondent's parental status as an important tie to first marriage into the models. A set of time-varying dichotomous variables indicates if the respondent has (1) no co-residential biological, adopted or foster child from a previous marriage (reference category), (2) 1 co-residential biological, adopted or foster child from a previous marriage or (3) 2 or more co-residential biological, adopted, foster children from a previous marriage. These variables are constructed by retrospective information on every child that did or did not form a part of the household on the moment of interview.

To identify whether the choice of a new partner is still influenced by the choice of a first marriage partner, we included a second education parameter, namely 'the educational level of the former partner. Again, this educational level was categorized as shown in Table 1 and operationalized by two dichotomous time-constant variables (with 'low educated' as reference category). In the DiF-survey were, besides single interviews, also double interviews (or interviews of both partners from one dissolved reference marriage) conducted. By this, we could impute the educational level of one respondent as 'the educational level of the former partner' to another respondent when he or she refused or did not know the answer on the question 'What is the highest obtained qualification of your former spouse/wife?'.

At last, we also developed the time-constant continuous variable 'duration of first marriage' (in years) and the time-constant dichotomous variable 'pre-marital cohabitation' as first marriage

characteristics. Both characteristics already proved to be potential risk factors for divorce (Corijn, Pasteels, & Mortelmans, 2012; Liefbroer & Dourleijn, 2006; Ono, 2005). Without controlling for them, may bias the results (Shafer, 2009). The respondent's first marriage duration was derived from the respondent's reports for the year in which he or she first married and legally divorced. The dichotomous variable 'pre-marital cohabitation' indicates that the respondent cohabited with his or her former partner prior to marrying.

Parental characteristics. Another factor that proved to be a risk factor of divorce, and is included in our analyses, is the time-constant dichotomous variable 'parental separation' (Liefbroer & Dourleijn, 2006; Wagner & Weiss, 2006). This measure indicates that the respondent's parents got divorced, never got married or never lived together before his or her own separation.

It has also been proven that the father's and/or mother's educational level can have an indirect and direct effect on the son's and daughter's educational homogamy in his or her first marriage (Blossfeld & Timm, 2003) and second marriage (Shafer, 2009). For this reason, we made two dichotomous time-constant variables which indicate if the respondent has at least one parent that completed upper secondary education or at least one parent that completed upper secondary education (having at least one parent that completed lower secondary education is the reference category). We made this parental educational level by the respondents reported educational level of each parent. If one parent was lower educated than the other, we kept the earned educational level of the highest educated parent.

Values and beliefs. The two control variables 'religious' and 'degree of boundary ambiguity', both on time of interview, give us an indication of how individuals' values and beliefs are correlated with their repartnering patterns. Since we do not have an indication of how religious someone was when he or she got divorced (there is no retrospective data about values and norms available in the DiF-survey), we made the explicit assumption that someone's degree of religiousness on time of interview is highly correlated with his or her degree on time of separation. The degree of boundary ambiguity, or the way someone copes with the changes in his or her family since divorce, can also change over time (Boss, Greenberg, & Pearce-McCall, 1990). Yet, we suppose that a high boundary ambiguity on time of interview would also be high (or even higher) on time of separation. Respondents that gave a high score on the religiousness scale of 0 to 10 (a score from 6 to 10), were coded as 1 on the dichotomous time-constant variable 'religious'. The divorced adults Boundary Ambiguity Scale used in the DiF-survey is based on the original Boundary Ambiguity Scale compiled by Pauline Boss, but with slight modifications in wording and a few changed items (Boss et al., 1990). We operationalized the 22 items - Boundary Ambiguity Scale without the five last items (items 17-22 were only asked to the divorced respondents with children) and by the rules of Boss et al. (1990): a high score on the scale, means a high 'degree of boundary ambiguity'.

(Re)marriage market constraints. At last, but not least, we will include control variables which give an indication of the marriage market constraints that men and women are faced with after divorce. By using the GGP-data, we could calculate the amount of 25- till 50-years' old single men and women, per educational level (categorized as in Table 1). In Figure 2, the absolute and relative distributions per educational level are displayed, for men and women separately. We conclude that the amount of singles between 25 and 50 years old has risen across time (since +/- 1998 a small drop, then relatively stable), just like the amount of all men and women between 25 and 50 years old (not shown in figure). The proportion of singles in the total population has, according to the GGP-date, almost raised with +/- 8% during the period 1980-2007: from +/- 11,7% in 01/01/1980 to +/- 20% in 31/12/2007. The results from the GGP-data seem to be quite robust: if we control these results with the official statistics from Statistics Belgium, similar trends were determined.

If we take a closer look to the singles only, we draw a sharp decline of the proportion low educated men. Especially medium educated men represent at the end of the observation period a high proportion of all single men. The slight decrease of highly educated single men at the end of the observation period may be explained by the fact that highly educated men are desirable matches on the marriage market, but also by the reversal of the gender gap in higher education. If men and women are inherently prone to educational homogamy, highly educated men have a large market of highly educated women available to them. The proportion highly educated single women remained during the whole observation period relatively high. Just as like the male respondents, we observe a decreasing proportion of low educated single women.

Until now, we are still looking after the best way to operationalize the information gathered by the GGP-data. Because not every divorced man or woman is looking for a new partner between the ages 25 and 50, but between more restricted age barriers according to his or her own age, we are considering calculating the amount of singles per specific age. For example: calculating the amount of single men and women 3 or 5 years younger and 3 or 5 years older (maybe asymmetric between men and women) than the respondent himself. For this reason, the upcoming results are still without controlling for possibly marriage market constraints.

Means and standard deviations for the independent variables are presented in Table 2.

FIGURE 2. Absolute (left) and relative (right) distributions of 25- till 50- years' old single men (upper layer) and women (lower layer), per educational level

A. Men





B. Women





Source: Generations and Gender Programme, own calculations

TABLE 2. Means and Standard Deviations of Independent Variables (Weighted M and SD, Unweighted N)

		Recohabitation				Remarriage			
		Men		Women		Men		Women	
Variable Names	Variable Definitions	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD	M	SD
Time variables									
Divorce cohort	Divorced between 1980-1989 (ref.)	0,165	0,371	0,156	0,363	0,165	0,371	0,156	0,363
1990-1999	Divorced between 1990-1999	0,383	0,486	0,417	0,493	0,387	0,487	0,419	0,493
2000-2005	Divorced between 2000-2005	0,451	0,498	0,427	0,495	0,448	0,497	0,425	0,494
Age at separation	Younger than 31 years old (ref.)	0,261	0,439	0,370	0,483	0,261	0,439	0,371	0,483
31-40	Between 31 and 40 years old	0,494	0,500	0,455	0,498	0,492	0,500	0,454	0,498
≥41	41 years old or more	0,245	0,430	0,175	0,380	0,247	0,431	0,175	0,380
Long-term socioeconomic status									
Highest educational level at time of interview	Completed lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2) (ref.)	0,272	0,445	0,233	0,423	0,272	0,445	0,233	0,423
Medium educated	Completed upper secondary education (ISCED 3-4)	0,414	0,493	0,402	0,490	0,415	0,493	0,401	0,490
Highly educated	Completed tertiary education (ISCED 5-6)	0,314	0,464	0,364	0,481	0,313	0,464	0,366	0,482
Current socioeconomic status									
Occupational status at time t	Unemployed (ref.)	0,045	0,207	0,149	0,356	0,045	0,208	0,148	0,356
Part-time	Working less than 95%	0,015	0,120	0,216	0,412	0,015	0,120	0,216	0,411
Full-time	Working 95% or more	0,940	0,237	0,634	0,482	0,941	0,237	0,636	0,481
First marriage ties									
Co-residential child(ren) at time t	Having no co-residential child (ref.)	0,586	O,493	0,277	0,448	0,585	O,493	0,278	0,448
1 co-residential child	Having 1 co-residential child	0,188	0,391	0,276	0,447	0,188	0,391	0,275	0,447
2 or more co-residential children	Having 2 or more co-residential children	0,226	0,418	0,446	0,497	0,227	0,419	0,446	0,497
First marriage characterisitcs									
Highest educational level former partner at time of interview	Completed lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2) (ref.)	0,313	0,464	0,302	0,459	0,315	0,465	0,301	0,459
Medium educated	Completed upper secondary education (ISCED 3-4)	0,398	0,490	0,424	0,494	0,397	0,490	0,421	0,494
Highly educated	Completed tertiary education (ISCED 5-6)	0,289	0,453	0,274	0,446	0,288	0,453	0,277	0,447
Premarital cohabitation with former partner	No premarital cohabitation with former partner (ref.)	0,705	0,456	0,729	0,444	0,710	0,455	0,732	0,443
Yes	Cohabited with former partner before being married	0,295	0,456	0,270	0,444	0,293	0,455	0,268	0,443
Duration first marriage	Time between date of marriage and date of separation, in years	13,50	7,575	13,51	7,495	13,48	7,575	13,50	7,495
Parental characteristics									
Parental separation at time of separation	Parents did not separate (ref.)	0,902	0,298	0,895	0,307	0,903	0,296	0,897	0,304
Yes	Parents got separated	0,098	0,298	0,105	0,307	0,097	0,296	0,103	0,304
Highest educational level parents at time of interview	At least one parent completed lower secondary education (ISCED 0-2) (ref.)	0,640	0,480	0,590	0,492	0,642	0,480	0,590	0,492
Medium educated	At least one parent completed upper secondary education (ISCED 3-4)	0,216	0,412	0,244	0,430	0,216	0,412	0,246	0,431
Highly educated	At least one parent completed tertiary education (ISCED 5-6)	0,143	0,351	0,165	0,372	0,142	0,350	0,164	0,370
Values and beliefs									
Religiousness at time of interview	Not to moderately religious (ref.)	0,717	0,450	0,628	0,483	0,717	0,450	0,628	0,483
Religious	Moderateley to strongly religious	0,282	0,450	0,372	0,483	0,283	0,450	0,372	0,483
Degree of boundary ambiguity at time of interview	Score on boundary ambiguity scale	26,10	4,958	26,82	5,398	26,13	5,004	26,82	5,398
Person-months		68 848		92 930		124 018		147 711	
N		1133		1351		1145		1356	

Source: Divorce in Flanders, 2010

For time-varying variables, the means and standard deviations refer to the month in which the respondents got separated.

Preliminary Results

We report 4 coefficients for each independent variable (see Tables 3, 4, 5 & 6): its effect on the risk to cohabit/marry versus staying single/not remarried; its effect on the risk to cohabit/marry with a low educated men/women versus a highly educated men/women; its effect on the risk to cohabit/marry with a medium educated men/women versus a highly educated men/women and its effect on the risk to cohabit/marry with a low educated men/women versus a medium educated men/women (which can be derived from the other two).

First (cautious) interpretations of the fitted hazard models (not presented) reveal the following conclusions. First, homogamous repartnering (both marriage and cohabitation) seems to happen quicker and more often than heterogamous repartnering. Second, there seems to be continuity over subsequent unions that divorcing people are forming during their life courses: divorcees seem to have a relatively high risk of remarrying/recohabiting a partner with the same level of education as their first marriage partner.

TABLE 3. Exponential Coefficients for Predictors of Men's Entry into Cohabiting Unions After Separation (Weighted Coefficients, Unweighted N)

		Cohabit With		
	Cohabitation	A Low Educated Woman	A Medium Educated Woman	A Low Educated Woman
Indepent variables	Versus Staying Single	Versus A Highly Educated Woman		Versus A Medium Educated Woman
Intercept	0,075 ***	2,686	5,140 *	0,522
Time variables				
Duration since separation (0-12 months=ref.)				
13-24 months	0,765 *	0,786	0,721	1,090
25-36 months	0,576 ***	0,395 *	0,539	0,733
37-48 months	0,604 ***	0,652	0,621	1,050
49-84 months	0.385 ***	1,019	0,758	1,343
85-120 months	0,319 ***	1,153	0,710	1,625
121-240 months	0,241 ***	0,539	0,645	0,836
Divorce cohort (1980-1989=ref.)				
1990-1999	1,351 **	0,613	0,924	0,663
2000-2005	1.609 ***	0,786	1,306	0,602
Age at separation (≤30=ref.)				
31-40	0.904	0,976	0,604 *	1,617
≥41	0.581 **	0,766	0,690	1,111
Long-term socioeconomic status				
Highest educational level (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,155	0,281 ***	0,745	0,378 ***
Highly educated	1,409 **	0,064 ***	0,329 ***	0,196 ***
Current socioeconomic status				
Occupational status (unemployed=ref.)				
Part-time	2,228 *	0,509	0,164 *	3,106
Full-time	1,579 *	0,969	0,576	1,683
First marriage ties				
Co-residential child(ren) (no co-residential child=ref.)				
1 co-residential child	0,727 **	1,351	1,183	1,142
2 or more co-residential children	0,516 ***	0,769	0,433 **	1,774
First marriage characterisitcs				
Highest educational level former partner (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,004	0,521 *	1,478	0,353 ***
Highly educated	0,987	0,502	0,751	0,669
Premarital cohabitation with former partner (no=ref.)				
Yes	1,074	0,626	0,994	0,629
Duration first marriage	1,003	1,006	1,021	0,985
Parental characteristics				
Parental separation (no=ref.)				
Yes	1,134	0,970	0,707	1,372
Highest educational level parents (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,205	0,395 **	0,555 **	0,712
Highly educated	1,004	0,117 **	0,580 *	0,201 *
Values and beliefs				
Religiousness (not=ref.)				
Religious	0,925	1,250	1,430	0,874
Degree of boundary ambiguity	0,930 ***	1,038	0,997	1,041
Miscellaneous parameters				
Number of person-months	54 929		54 929	
Number of events	673	132	266	132
χ^2 of al coefficients (df)	348,358(25)		611,570(75)	

Source: Divorce in Flanders, 2010

* p≤0,05; ** p≤0,01; *** p≤0,001

TABLE 4. Exponential Coefficients for Predictors of Women's Entry into Cohabiting Unions After Separation (Weighted Coefficients, Unweighted N)

		Cohabit With		
	Cohabitation	A Low Educated Man	A Medium Educated Man	A Low Educated Man
Indepent variables	Versus Staying Single	Versus A Highly Educated Man		Versus A Medium Educated Man
Intercept	0,094 ***	47,751 ***	35,198 ***	1,357
Time variables				
Duration since separation (0-12 months=ref.)				
13-24 months	0,516 ***	0,901	0,999	0,902
25-36 months	0,574 ***	0,735	0,808	0,911
37-48 months	0,506 ***	0,611	0,678	0,902
49-84 months	0,318 ***	0,796	0,708	0,983
85-120 months	0,195 ***	0,874	0,276	3,171
121-240 months	0,158 ***	0,879	0,608	1,447
Divorce cohort (1980-1989=ref.)				
1990-1999	1,243	0,643	0,596	1,079
2000-2005	1,641 ***	1,005	1,107	0,908
Age at separation (≤30=ref.)				
31-40	0,679 ***	0,773	0,885	0,873
≥41	0,525 ***	1,191	1,063	1,120
Long-term socioeconomic status				
Highest educational level (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,020	0,602	0,884	0,681
Highly educated	1,061	0,217 ***	0,269 ***	0,808
Current socioeconomic status				
Occupational status (unemployed=ref.)				
Part-time	1,239	0,555	1,034	0,536
Full-time	1,169	0,508 *	0,741	0,686
First marriage ties				
Co-residential child(ren) (no co-residential child=ref.)				
1 co-residential child	0,619 ***	0,962	0,831	1,157
2 or more co-residential children	0,535 ***	1,886 *	1,622 *	1,162
First marriage characterisitcs				
Highest educational level former partner (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	0,970	0,400 ***	0,807	0,496 **
Highly educated	0,808	0,102 ***	0,404 *	0,252 ***
Premarital cohabitation with former partner (no=ref.)				
Yes	0,939	0,659	1,055	0,624
Duration first marriage	0,982 *	0,977	0,964	1,013
Parental characteristics				
Parental separation (no=ref.)				
Yes	1,124	0,920	1,221	0,753
Highest educational level parents (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	0,921	0,745	0,795	0,937
Highly educated	1,187	0,584	0,740	0,790
Values and beliefs				
Religiousness (not=ref.)				
Religious	0,950	1,088	0,744	1,462
Degree of boundary ambiguity	0,964 ***	0,966	0,963	1,003
Miscellaneous parameters				
Number of person-months	77 272		77 272	
Number of events	714	180	311	180
χ^2 of al coefficients (df)	552,184(25)		817,123(75)	

Source: Divorce in Flanders, 2010

* p≤0,05; ** p≤0,01; *** p≤0,001

TABLE 5. Exponential Coefficients for Predictors of Men's Entry into Marital Unions After Separation (Weighted Coefficients, Unweighted N)

		Marry With		
	Marriage	A Low Educated Woman	A Medium Educated Woman	A Low educated Woman
Indepent variables	Versus Not Remarried	Versus A Highly Educated Woman		Versus A Medium Educated Woman
Intercept	0,004 ***	5,658	3,449	1,639
Time variables				
Duration since separation (0-12 months=ref.)				
13-24 months	5,161 ***	0,412	1,425	0,289
25-36 months	6,665 ***	0,303	0,670	0,452
37-48 months	5,830 ***	0,302	0,587	0,515
49-84 months	6,520 ***	0,155 *	0,454	0,341
85-120 months	4,875 ***	0,232	0,331	0,699
121-240 months	4,361 ***	0,218	0,916	0,238
Divorce cohort (1980-1989=ref.)				
1990-1999	1,231	1,311	1,259	1,042
2000-2005	1,128	1,502	1,108	1,356
Age at separation (≤30=ref.)				
31-40	0,966	0,922	0,629	1,465
≥41	0,774	0,458	0,954	0,480
Long-term socioeconomic status				
Highest educational level (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	0,951	0,578	1,008	0,573
Highly educated	1,146	0,103 ***	0,445 *	0,232 *
Current socioeconomic status				
Occupational status (unemployed=ref.)				
Part-time	1,156	0,869	1,028	0,845
Full-time	1,494	0,570	0,857	0,666
First marriage ties				
Co-residential child(ren) (no co-residential child=ref.)				
1 co-residential child	1,142	1,091	0,693	1,574
2 or more co-residential children	0,857	0,371	0,320 **	1,158
First marriage characterisitcs				
Highest educational level former partner (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,099	0,578	1,678	0,345 **
Highly educated	1,070	0,517	0,996	0,519
Premarital cohabitation with former partner (no=ref.)				
Yes	0,817	0,587	1,165	0,504
Duration first marriage	0,988	1,016	1,001	1,015
Parental characteristics				
Parental separation (no=ref.)				
Yes	0,918	0,717	0,501	1,431
Highest educational level parents (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,259	0,340 *	0,576	0,591
Highly educated	1,374	0,178 *	0,604	0,295
Values and beliefs				
Religiousness (not=ref.)				
Religious	1,038	0,991	1,080	0,917
Degree of boundary ambiguity	0,923 ***	1,039	0,937	1,041
Miscellaneous parameters				
Number of person-months	99 908		99 908	
Number of events	368	73	144	73
χ^2 of al coefficients (df)	128,532(25)		270,421(75)	

Source: Divorce in Flanders, 2010

* p≤0,05; ** p≤0,01; *** p≤0,001

TABLE 6. Exponential Coefficients for Predictors of Women's Entry into Marital Unions After Separation (Weighted Coefficients, Unweighted N)

		Marry With		
	Marriage	A Low Educated Man	A Medium Educated Man	A Low educated Man
Indepent variables	Versus Not Remarried	Versus A Highly Educated Man		Versus A Medium Educated Man
Intercept	0,014 ***	20,227 *	29,459 **	0,687
Time variables				
Duration since separation (0-12 months=ref.)				
13-24 months	2,526 **	1,990	0,844	2,358
25-36 months	5,525 ***	2,418	1,087	2,224
37-48 months	5,360 ***	2,504	0,709	3,531
49-84 months	4,214 ***	1,343	0,634	2,119
85-120 months	2,695 ***	2,202	0,650	3,390
121-240 months	2,039 *	3,399	0,908	3,742
Divorce cohort (1980-1989=ref.)				
1990-1999	0,932	0,589	0,617	0,954
2000-2005	1,339	0,863	0,892	0,967
Age at separation (≤30=ref.)				
31-40	0,689 **	0,628	0,889	0,706
≥41	0,590	1,183	1,386	0,853
Long-term socioeconomic status				
Highest educational level (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	0,891	0,601	0,921	0,652
Highly educated	0,861	0,121 ***	0,194 ***	0,624
Current socioeconomic status				
Occupational status (unemployed=ref.)				
Part-time	0,898	0,403 *	0,663	0,608
Full-time	0,592 ***	0,584	0,767	0,761
First marriage ties				
Co-residential child(ren) (no co-residential child=ref.)				
1 co-residential child	0,810	0,840	0,867	0,969
2 or more co-residential children	0,613 ***	2,233	1,273	1,754
First marriage characterisitcs				
Highest educational level former partner (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,054	0,451 *	0,904	0,498 *
Highly educated	0,798	0,135 ***	0,378 *	0,358 *
Premarital cohabitation with former partner (no=ref.)				
Yes	0,782	0,876	1,463	0,599
Duration first marriage	0,968 **	0,986	0,957	1,031
Parental characteristics				
Parental separation (no=ref.)				
Yes	1,473 *	0,866	1,043	0,831
Highest educational level parents (low=ref.)				
Medium educated	1,101	1,209	1,242	0,974
Highly educated	1,407 *	0,805	1,000	0,805
Values and beliefs				
Religiousness (not=ref.)				
Religious	1,101	1,334	0,841	1,585
Degree of boundary ambiguity	0,946 ***	0,962	0,979	0,983
Miscellaneous parameters				
Number of person-months	121 671		121 671	
Number of events	406	109	183	109
χ^2 of al coefficients (df)	245,096(25)		413,310(75)	

Source: Divorce in Flanders, 2010

* p≤0,05; ** p≤0,01; *** p≤0,001

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