Reassessing the Relationship between Wives' Relative Income in the Household and Marital Quality: The Role of Gender Ideology

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Abstract

Previous research regarding the effects of wives' share of household income on marital quality presents contradictory findings. Wife-to-couple income ratio serves as a measure of wives' economic contributions relative to their husbands. Using data on wives and their husbands' from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979-2010 (n=2528), I reexamine the relationship between wives' relative income and marital quality in first marriages using fixed effects models. Controlling for family's economic situation, characteristics of the family, wife's and husband's labor force participation and period effects, I find that wives' relative income is positively related to marital quality when wives' income share remains between 10-80%. However, the effect reverses when the income share falls below 10% and exceeds 80%. The direction of the effect also depends on women's view of traditional family-gender roles. Wives who have normative family-gender attitudes report lower levels of marital quality as their percent income increase. On the contrary, wives with nontraditional attitudes actually report higher marital quality when they earn a higher share of income.

Introduction

Sociological theories have long posited that women's employment and marital quality and stability are related to each other. However, whether women's labor force participation strengthens or debilitates marriages is still an open question. On the one hand, women's employment may create dissatisfaction in women with the gendered division of household labor and marital power, which results in marital conflict and dissolution of marriage (Rogers & Amato, 1997). Additionally, wives' economic independence coupled with their demands for change towards more egalitarian roles in marriage may debilitate marriages (Knoester & Booth, 2000). On the other hand, women's increasing economic resources may in fact increase marital quality and stability by providing a buffer for economic hardship (Conger et al., 1990; Greenstein, 1990) and by establishing gender equality between spouses (Scanzoni, 1982).

The period after the Second World War in the United States witnessed drastic changes in women's labor force participation and income capabilities. Between years 1970 and 2010, women's labor force participation reached peak levels of 60% in 1999 and has remained around this level since then while men's labor force participation levels have actually dropped from 79.7% to 71.2% (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011a). During the same period, women's earnings relative to men have also improved steadily, from 62% of men's earnings in 1979 up to 81% in 2010 (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2011b).

Parallel to changes in women's labor force participation and earnings potential, the contribution of wives' earnings to family income has increased from 26.6% in 1970 to 37.1% in 2009. In 2010, in almost 30% of all dual-earner marriages wives had higher incomes than husbands, an almost twofold increase from levels of 16% in 1981 (US Census Bureau, 2012). Since these numbers include all married couples regardless of age, it is reasonable to expect them to be even higher for newer marriages considering women's increasing labor force participation and declining wage gap between the sexes.

Alongside women's growing role in the labor market and higher earnings potential, marital quality in the United States also seems to be declining since early 1970s. For instance, the probability of divorce first increased until early 1980s and has remained

around 50% since then (Bramlett & Mocher, 2002; Cherlin, 2010; Raley & Bumpass, 2003). Glenn (1991) found that from the early 1970s to the late 1980s, reported marital happiness declined slightly in the United States. Finally, Amato, Johnson, Booth, and Rogers (2003) found that although marital happiness did not change much between 1980 and 2000, marital interaction declined significantly.

These two trends, women's increasing economic resources and declining marital stability at the population level, provide provisional support for the destabilization view. In order to test whether this view holds at the individual level, a number of studies focused on the links spousal income dynamics and marital quality (Furdyna, Tucker, & James, 2008; Stacy J. Rogers & Danelle D. DeBoer, 2001; Wilcox & Nock, 2006). The results of these studies so far are not unequivocal. For instance, Rogers and DeBoer found increases in married women's relative income significantly increase their marital happiness. On the other hand, Furdyna et al. (2008) recently found that wife-to-husband income ratio and marital happiness is negatively associated, but for only White women. Finally, Wilcox and Nock (2006) found no significant relationship between wife's earnings as a percent of couples' income and marital happiness.

Following Nock (1995) and Rogers (2004), I argue that wives' relative income may affect marital quality differently depending on the levels of dependence between the spouses. I also contend that gender ideology should be considered as an important factor in terms of explaining the discrepancies in previous research.

Although there has been a trend towards more egalitarian attitudes towards women's employment in American society, men are still much more likely to express traditional attitudes than women, especially as it relates to housework and family decisions (Carter, Corra, & Carter, 2009; Ciabattari, 2001; Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001). For instance, using GSS data for years between 1974 and 2006, Carter et al. found that White men hold the most traditional attitudes towards women's role over the study period, only followed by Black men. Their composite measure included questions such as "[It] is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family."

The main purpose of the research presented here is to provide an empirical test for theories which suggest a relationship between women's relative earnings in the household and marital quality. First, I argue that unobserved variable bias may have influenced results of previous research, leading to inconsistent findings. Second, considering differential change in gender attitudes between the sexes and still unequal distribution of housework, I suggest that wives' gender ideology will moderate the relationship between wives' relative income and marital quality and how they perceive their marital quality. Specifically, I expect that wives who hold traditional gender attitudes towards the role of women in the family will report lower marital happiness as their contribution to family income increases.

I aim at providing solutions for the problems in previous research I specify in the following section on the link between wives' relative income and marital quality. I utilize fixed effects regression models, an analytical strategy which allows me to control for all unmeasured but time-invariant factors such as religiosity and gender-family attitudes. I use data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth 1979 which provides very detailed information on the employment history of wives and their husbands and marital conflict in addition to other characteristics of the marriage.

Wife's Relative Income and Marital Quality

Family can be widely thought of as a social union which requires certain activities (i.e., tasks) to be performed. Especially when both spouses are employed, the process of allocation of individuals to these activities may require spouses to negotiate (Scanzoni, 1982), which can be an important source of conflict within marriage. In that case, employment and earnings can be important resources which give relative bargaining power to each spouse in these negotiations (Lundberg & Pollak, 1993, 1996). More specifically, a wife with more resources may seek more egalitarian roles in marriage, which can lead to marital conflict if her husband resist for the continuation of status quo in gendered roles.

Recent empirical research shows that this is especially true in terms of housework done in the household. Schneider (2011) has recently found that there was a nonlinear relationship between wives' relative earnings and minutes of housework done by the wife: For those wives who earned between 0-60% of the total household income, their economic contributions were negatively associated with the time they spent in the housework. It should be noted that this negative relationship did not hold at all levels of wives' relative income.

In this context, gender ideology can operate as a lens through which individuals inspect the dynamics of their marital relationship (Davis & Greenstein, 2009). Put differently, gender ideology may simply form individuals' expectation from their marriages. More specifically, it can influence the way spouses perceive division of household labor (Greenstein, 1996), parental practices (Coltrane, 1996; Hochschild & Machung, 2003) and the necessity of women's employment and the value of women's earnings to the family (Corrigall & Konrad, 2007).

If there is a gender-normative role distribution in the family (which assigns housework to the wife and market work to the husband) as role specialization perspective assumes, then alteration of these roles may upset marital quality in two ways (Becker, 1981; Oppenheimer, 1997). First, it may create a hostile family environment by introducing status competition among spouses. Second, it can undermine the gains from being married by reducing the housework done by wives and other family-related services husbands would get from wives who are not working. Both of these are especially relevant for husbands whose role as "provider" is being challenged.

While the gender gap in wives' and husbands' allocation of time to paid and unpaid work has narrowed during the last decade, it still persists (Bianchi & Milkie, 2010). Bianchi et al. (2000) shows that although the wife/husband ratio of hours spent on laundry and housecleaning fell dramatically over the years between 1965 and 1995, there were far smaller changes in the ratios for cooking meals and meal cleanup. The amount of total time spent in childcare for mothers actually increased dramatically over 1965-1998, illustrating the rising complications of family life which often create numerous opportuni-

ties for conflict (Bianchi, 2000). Given women's increasing labor force participation and commensurate rise in their earnings but lagged change in the distribution of household chores, the circumstances are ideal for marital conflict.

In this context, the effects of women's earnings share may influence marital quality differently depending on spouses' gender/family attitudes. In support of this "interaction" view, Furdyna et al. (2008) found that wife-to-husband income ratio and marital happiness were negatively associated when women held traditional values. Wives who have traditional gender attitudes may strive to meet the role expectations in marriage and family in addition to expectations of labor market. This effort can lead them "try harder" while trying to avoid the effects of work-family spillover (Hochschild, 2001; Hochschild & Machung, 2003). In addition, when spouses are congruent with each other regarding gender ideology, this can serve as "a stabilizing force" in the marriage (Sayer & Bianchi, 2000). Specifically, wife's relative income would be expected to decrease marital conflict when both wife and husband think that they should both contribute to the family economically.

Both bargaining and role specialization models of marriage imply that women's relative income will increase marital conflict, a hypothesis also known as the independence effect (Oppenheimer, 1997) due to the assumption that wives become more independent as their income increases. However, nuclear families where wives and husbands specialize in separate spheres can be economically vulnerable in postmodern industrial society (Oppenheimer, 1997). Women's increasing labor force participation and increasing relative earnings can be considered as a result of the necessity. For this reason, wives' income may actually decrease marital conflict by alleviating marital problems caused by economic hardship (Conger et al., 1990; Voydanoff, 1990; Voydanoff, Donnelly, & Fine, 1988). In addition, marriages where women work and provide some form of earnings can lead to increased marital asset-sharing (Ono, 1998).

In a similar vein, Nock (1995) argues that when spouses are dependent on each other for some resource, their commitment to the relationship increase. This dependency may be due to education, prestige, housework, and income. He found that income dependency,

as measured by respondent's income as percent of total income, increases commitment for both men and women, but it had a larger effect for women (Nock, 1995).

Empirical studies which test the relationship between wives' employment and marital stability mostly focus on the link between wives' relative income in the household and the risk of divorce (Greenstein, 1995; Heckert, Nowak, & Snyder, 1998; Kalmijn, Loeve, & Manting, 2007; Rogers, 2004; Sayer & Bianchi, 2000; Schoen, Astone, Kim, Rothert, & Standish, 2002; Teachman, 2010). Yet divorce need not be the only relevant outcome to test the assertions made by theories which focus on women's employment and marital stability. Research has shown that wives' relative income is highly volatile and subject to change over the course of marriage (Winslow-Bowe, 2006, 2009). If wives do not have persistent income advantages they may still choose to remain in unhappy marriages even during the periods when they have increased economic resources. As a result, focusing on divorce may conceal the effect of wife's earnings on marriage quality. In other words, the effect of wife's earnings may present itself not as a leading cause of divorce yet may still cause instability within the marriage in the form of lower marital happiness.

Religious women are less likely to participate in the labor force (Lehrer, 1999) and more likely to face employment trade-offs (Ammons & Edgell, 2007) than their counterpart. Previous empirical research also shows higher religiosity and traditional gender attitudes are associated with higher reported marital happiness (Amato & Booth, 1995; Lichter & Carmalt, 2009; Shehan, Bock, & Lee, 1990). Putting these two findings together, taking no account of these two variables in regression models would lead to incorrect estimates (underestimation, in this case) for coefficients under investigation.

Rogers and DeBoer (2001) failed to control for such factors as religiosity, traditional family values and gender ideology. In addition, the time interval between the two waves of data they used was eight years, which is a theoretically long enough time period for many events to can occur within and outside of marriage to influence marital happiness. Although Wilcox and Nock and Furdyna et al.'s studies takes into account the effects of gender ideology and religious attendance, they did not include wives' cumulative workforce experiences in their analysis due to lack of data, presenting similar methodological

problems to Rogers and DeBoer's study. It is likely that changes in wives' employment over the course of marriage can influence marital quality and stability (Schoen, Rogers, & Amato, 2006). Finally, Furdyna et al. used a sample of urban population, including only respondents from cities with populations of at least 100,000 people.

Considering all aforementioned factors, I hypothesize that wives' income share will positively affect marital quality. However, I also test whether the relationship is non-linear, changing depending on the level of wives' income share. I also expect to see that wives who express non-traditional attitudes will be more likely to report positive marital quality as their income share increase. Reversely, I expect that wives who are normative or traditional will report lower levels of marital quality as their income share increase.

Method

Data

I use panel data from National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979-2010 (NLSY79). NLSY79 is a nationally representative sample of 12686 men and women who were 14-22 years old when they were first interviewed in 1979. The sample was interviewed annually through 1994 and biannually through 2010. NLSY79 has two advantages for the purposes of the present study. First, it contains repeated measures of marriage quality every 2 years beginning in 1992, generating ten survey waves of data. Second, it contains detailed information on marriages over the study period, so variation in the duration, quality and income dynamics within marriages is captured. The latter is especially important to successfully utilize fixed effects model.

NLSY79 included marital quality questions starting from 1992 until 2010 biannually. Only married or unmarried women with co-resident partners were asked these questions, so the initial sample for this study consists of the 6,283 female NLSY79 respondents (50%). I further restrict sample to female respondents who were married at least two waves to the same spouse during and after 1992 (the survey year NLSY79 started asking marital quality questions). Since previous research has shown that second or higher degree

marriages may be different from first marriages in terms of marital stability (Bramlett & Mocher, 2002) and marital quality (Tach & Halpern-Meekin, 2009), I focus here only on first marriages. The final sample after these restrictions includes 2,296 female respondents (approximately 40% of the original female sample).

NLSY79 started asking marital quality questions in 1992, marriages which began and ended before that time is not included in the sample (25% of all first marriages). In addition, for those marriages which started before 1992, the dynamics in the earlier period is not captured. As NLSY79 interviewed respondents biannually after 1992 and at least two observations are necessary from the same marriage to use fixed effects model properly, the present sample do not include marriages which lasted less than two years. Finally, NLSY79 asked marital quality questions only to female subsample. As a result, using this sample can account only for the marital experiences perceived by women and not men.

Variables

The dependent variable is in this study is marital quality. I constructed a marital quality scale using two sets of items. The first item set included 10 responses given to the following questions in NLSY79: "How frequently do you and [spouse/partner] do the following: (have arguments about)... chores or responsibilities; children; money; showing affection to each other; leisure or free time; drinking; other women; his relatives; your relatives; religion?" These items measure the negative aspects that are related to marital quality. The second item set included responses given to the following questions in NLSY79: "How often do you and [spouse/partner] do the following: calmly discuss something; laugh together; tell each other about your day?" These items can be considered as measuring positive aspects of marital life. I recoded the items so that higher score indicates higher marital quality. For respondents who had only one missing value out of 13 items (mostly childless individuals who did not answer the question about children), I assigned the mean value of the remaining 12 items for the missing variable[1]. Cronbach's alpha for

[1]A small number of cases missing more than one item were dropped from the analysis.

all 13 items ranged from .77 to .79 depending on the wave. I constructed the scale by summing these items. Values for the final scale ranged from 13 to 52.

The independent variable of interest is wife-to-couple income ratio. It is measured as the female respondent's reported actual income from wages, salaries, farming and business activities divided by total earnings from wages, salaries, farming and business activities reported jointly by the couple. In 270 person-waves, either wives or their husband reported wages and salaries even though they reported zero weeks worked. I assigned zero earnings for these person-waves. Finally, if women reported zero earnings for a particular wave but they did not report their husband's earnings, I assigned zero as their proportion (6.3% of person-waves).

I constructed a family/gender attitudes scale using five items to test the interaction hypothesis. Many researchers have used NLSY79 data to analyze gender attitudes (see, Davis & Greenstein, 2009) and I followed a similar approach with previous research to construct the scale. Respondents were asked whether they agree with the following six statements: (1) "A woman's place is in the home, not in the office or shop," (2) "A wife who carries out her full family responsibilities doesn't have time for outside employment," (3) "It is much better for everyone concerned if the man is the achiever outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and family," (4) "Men should share the work around the house with women, such as doing dishes, cleaning, and so forth," (5) "Women are much happier if they stay at home and take care of their children," (6) "Employment of both parents is necessary to keep up with the high cost of living." Respondents answered using a 4-point scale. Statements were asked to the respondents in 1979, 1982, 1987 and 2004. I recoded items so that higher values mean traditional attitude towards family-gender issues. I constructed the measure by summing five items. Although both measurements in 1987 and 2004 were possible candidates for the analysis, I used the measurement in 2004 as it is the closest to more survey years than the one in 1987. Cronbach's alpha for the year 2004 was .80. Values for the final scale ranged from 0 to 17 (i.e. there were not any respondents who had a score of 18). Finally, I created an ordinal categorical measure using this scale. I assigned respondents who had values lower than one standard

deviation from the mean to the non-traditional category. Those who had higher than one standard deviation above the mean were labeled as traditional. Respondent whose values ranges around the mean within one standard deviation were labeled as normative. I discuss the sensitivity of the results by the operationalization of gender/family attitude in discussion section.

I included a number of time-varying control variables which might be related to marital quality. I use wife's actual earnings in the previous year to account for any direct effect of income (see, Oppenheimer, 1997). I calculated the age of the respondent in years for each wave. The length of marriage was measured as the number of months the respondent has been married to her husband at each survey year. I categorized this measure to see if marital length has any non-linear relationship with marital quality. The categories included 0-3 Years, 3-6 Years, 6-9 Years, and more than 9 Years (+9 Years). Economic situation of the family is measured by number of weeks the respondent and her spouse worked in the past year, whether the family received any type of welfare and whether family were below poverty line during the past year. I include the number of children the married couple had in the household at the time of each survey as a set of dummies. I compare the childless with those who have one, two and three or more children in the household. Finally, I include a time variable (in years) and a quadratic component to control for any period effect.

Analytical Strategy

Fixed effects regression models used in this study allow me to control for unobserved time-invariant variables whose effects on the dependent variable are the same over time. These time-invariant factors may include both the characteristics of marriage (e.g., whether couple cohabitated before marriage, time they spent cohabitating before marriage) and the husband (e.g., race, religious affiliation, religiosity, etc.). However, this strategy comes with a tradeoff: Main effects of important time-invariant variables sociologists are generally interested in, such as gender or race, cannot be directly measured (as they cancel each other in multiple regression equations). There are two solutions to this problem.

The first one is to include an interaction term between time-invariant measures and all time-varying factors in the model. This is highly costly in statistical terms as it doubles the number of parameters. The other solution, creating stratified subsamples, leaves fewer observations for smaller subgroups. During the analysis stage, I experimented with both strategies and decided to use the former option to show the effects of wives' income share on marital quality for specific subgroups.

Results

I start the analysis by examining the descriptive statistics for some of the control variables and the independent variable of interest, women's income contribution to the household by the length of marriage. The descriptive statistics can be seen in Table 2. I created these categories with consideration of qualitative meaning. For instance, 0-3 Years category can be considered as "Newlywed/Honeymooners" for their problems will not be as apparent as in other couples and they would be expected, on average, to be happier. Marital quality perceived by women decreases as the length of marriage increases. However, the relationship is not linear as after 9-year threshold, the mean score increases again. That may be due to a selective exit bias as those who are unhappy in their marriages might be seeing certain years between 6-9 years as an exit point from an unhappy marriage. This finding seems to support the "7-year itch" argument in popular media.

Wife's earnings as proportion of total couple earnings is quiet high at the early years of marriage, around 40%, yet decreases down to levels of 30% for marriages that lasted more than 9 years. These numbers, on average, are comparable to those found in other studies (Nock, 1995; Rogers, 2004; Schneider, 2011). This finding should be analyzed with a focus on another covariate, wives' recent labor force participation, which is also decreasing as time spent in marriage increases. The only exception is marriages over 9 years in which wives seem to increase their labor force participation a bit. Note that husbands' labor force participation is increasing as marital length increases. As would be expected, long term married couples are less likely to be childless and there is a trend

towards 2 or more children which can be inferred from the decreasing percentages of childless and 1 child couples over the course of marriages. Finally, it seems that couples in the beginning of their marriages are more vulnerable to economic difficulties as they have the highest percentage of being below poverty line and of received welfare.

Table 3 presents fixed effects models for linear and non-linear effects of wife's percent earnings on marital quality. Model 1 shows the effects of wife's earnings as proportion of couple's total earnings on marital quality net of wife's total income, wife's age, couple's recent labor force participation, the indicators of economic hardship, marital length, number of children, and period effects in addition to unobserved time-invariant factors that may influence the relationship. There is no significant linear effect of wife's earnings share on marital quality. Among the time-varying covariates in the model, only marital length, number of children, and year (with its quadratic component) have significant effects. As descriptive statistics suggested, marital quality declines as marital length increases and the effect intensifies according to Wald tests. The number of children also decreases marital quality in a somewhat similar manner. Finally, year coefficient with its quadratic component suggests that marital quality in the United States has actually been improving since 1990s contrary to popular discourse of declining marital quality, at least for this cohort. Note that this may also be due to a selective exit bias with couples with unhappy marriages choose to simply divorce.

During the exploratory step of the analysis, I also tested theories that suggest a non-linear relationship between wives' earnings share and marital quality (Nock, 1995) by including quadratic and cubic terms in the model. Surprisingly, the model with cubic term was significant (shown in Model 2). The coefficient of Wife-to-Couple income share and its quadratic and cubic components overall suggested that there may be subgroups of wives for whom the direction of relationship between earnings share and marital quality may be different (and actually, opposite to each other). In other words, depending on levels of wives' earnings share, it affects marital quality differently.

Further analysis with spline regression models suggested two turning points of the effect, 10% and 80%. I created indicators using these cut-points and included them in

fixed effects model as interaction terms (Model 3, Table 3). Wife-to-Couple income share coefficient shows the effect of each percent increase for wives who earn between 0-10 percent of the couple's earnings (since it is the comparison group). Each percent increase for in wives' share for this group decreases marital quality. The interaction term for the second group, wives who earn between 10-80 percent of the couple's earnings, is larger than the comparison group, suggesting that for this group, the effect of wives' share is positive. In other words, each additional percent actually improves marital quality perceived by wife for this group. Finally, for wives who earn more than three quarter of the couple's income, the relationship between wives' income share and marital quality turns negative again since the difference between coefficients is negative.

These findings somewhat support Nock's argument regarding the positive effect of economic dependency on marital commitment. Nock (1995) defines economic dependence in terms of monetary contributions to the family/marriage and he suggests that an equal contribution of earnings (50%) will lead to highest levels of commitment. On the other hand, a gender perspective is necessitated to explain the negative effect on each side of the distribution. Considering that the breadwinner model of the family is still common as a gender ideology, more so for men than women (see, Thornton & Young-DeMarco, 2001), it can be speculated that men might be feeling threatened by their wives' contributions after certain levels (in this case, the empirical cut point seems to be approximately 80%).

Finally, Table 4 shows fixed effects models for linear effects of wife's percent earnings on marital quality, separately for nontraditional, normative, and traditional women. Results somewhat confirms my expectations. For women with nontraditional attitudes, each percent increase in wives' earnings share improves reported marital quality. On the contrary, for women with normative gender attitudes, each percent increase actually decrease marital quality. However, the relationship does not hold for traditional wives. This might be due to the small sample size for this group or it might be due to misspecification of gender attitudes categories.

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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Items of Marital Quality Scale

	mean	sd	min	max
How frequently do you and [spouse/partner] do the following:				
Have arguments about...				
Other women	3.688	0.655	1	4
Drinking	3.615	0.714	1	4
Religion	3.605	0.682	1	4
His relatives	3.364	0.841	1	4
Your relatives	3.209	0.859	1	4
Leisure or free time	3.030	0.893	1	4
Showing affection to each other	2.981	0.930	1	4
Children	2.725	0.888	1	4
Money	2.631	0.883	1	4
Chores or responsibilities	2.490	0.831	1	4
How often do you and [spouse/partner] do the following:				
Tell each other about your day	3.827	0.508	1	4
Laugh together	3.748	0.561	1	4
Calmly discuss something	3.701	0.625	1	4
N	14749			

Note: See text for item details.

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics by Marital Length, means and percentages, 1992-2010

	0-3 Years	3-6 Years	6-9 Years	+9 years	Total
Marital Quality	43.77	42.44	42.21	42.61	42.62
	(5.506)	(5.281)	(5.301)	(5.191)	(5.233)
Wife-to-Couple Income Ratio	0.426	0.366	0.324	0.304	0.317
	(0.268)	(0.255)	(0.264)	(0.259)	(0.262)
Wife's Total Income	35158.1	23327.7	20383.6	22125.4	22676.6
	(214403.2)	(25402.2)	(24485.3)	(28524.6)	(55053.9)
Age - Wife	34.56	34.71	34.98	40.77	39.39
	(4.825)	(4.792)	(4.847)	(5.666)	(6.032)
Weeks Worked Last Year - Wife	41.71	39.14	36.50	37.69	37.87
	(17.82)	(19.81)	(21.52)	(21.43)	(21.18)
Weeks Worked Last Year - Husband	48.01	48.76	49.01	49.45	49.28
	(10.33)	(8.669)	(9.148)	(8.035)	(8.343)
Poverty Status Last Year					
Not In Poverty	0.817	0.859	0.868	0.873	0.869
	(0.387)	(0.348)	(0.338)	(0.333)	(0.338)
In Poverty	0.0613	0.0374	0.0373	0.0358	0.0374
	(0.240)	(0.190)	(0.190)	(0.186)	(0.190)
Missing	0.121	0.103	0.0943	0.0910	0.0938
	(0.327)	(0.304)	(0.292)	(0.288)	(0.292)
Received Welfare Last Year (%)	0.0831	0.0393	0.0443	0.0340	0.0380
	(0.276)	(0.194)	(0.206)	(0.181)	(0.191)
Number of Children					
Childless (%)	0.534	0.326	0.191	0.113	0.158
	(0.499)	(0.469)	(0.393)	(0.317)	(0.365)
1 Child (%)	0.259	0.338	0.263	0.188	0.211
	(0.438)	(0.473)	(0.441)	(0.391)	(0.408)
2 Children (%)	0.110	0.235	0.389	0.426	0.392
	(0.314)	(0.424)	(0.488)	(0.495)	(0.488)
3+ Children (%)	0.0967	0.101	0.158	0.272	0.238
	(0.296)	(0.302)	(0.364)	(0.445)	(0.426)

Table 3: Results from Fixed Effects Regression Models of Marital Quality for First Marriages

	1	2	3
Wife-to-Couple Income Ratio	-0.016	-2.689*	-13.309***
	(0.224)	(1.314)	(3.902)
Quadratic Comp.		7.549*	
		(3.389)	
Cubic Comp.		-5.159*	
		(2.306)	
Wife-to-Couple Income Ratio (<10% ref.)			—
Between 10%-80%			13.722***
			(3.926)
Higher than 80%			10.984*
			(4.520)
Wife's Total Income	0.000	0.000	0.000*
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Age - Wife	-0.089	-0.089	-0.089
	(0.108)	(0.108)	(0.113)
Weeks Worked Last Year - Wife	-0.005*	-0.003	-0.001
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.004)
Weeks Worked Last Year - Husband	0.005	0.006	0.001
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.013)
Family Poverty Status (Not In Poverty ref.)	—	—	—
In Poverty	-0.392	-0.406	-0.153
	(0.237)	(0.241)	(0.287)
Missing	-0.131	-0.139	0.012
	(0.120)	(0.120)	(0.174)
Received Welfare Last Year	0.162	0.174	0.198
	(0.319)	(0.320)	(0.376)
Marital Lenght (0-3 Years ref.)	—	—	—
3-6 Years	-1.249***	-1.250***	-0.703
	(0.210)	(0.210)	(0.518)
6-9 Years	-1.570***	-1.575***	-1.099*
	(0.231)	(0.231)	(0.507)
9+ Years	-1.662***	-1.673***	-1.327*
	(0.256)	(0.256)	(0.517)
Number of Children (Childless ref.)	—	—	—
1 Child	-1.043***	-1.037***	-0.937**
	(0.159)	(0.159)	(0.320)
2 Children	-1.742***	-1.731***	-1.447***
	(0.169)	(0.169)	(0.312)
+3 Children	-1.760***	-1.749***	-1.401***
	(0.213)	(0.213)	(0.337)
Year	24.749***	24.826***	24.749***
	(4.788)	(4.782)	(4.810)
Quadratic Year	-0.006***	-0.006***	-0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	-2.48e+04***	-2.49e+04***	-2.48e+04***
	(4795.574)	(4789.710)	(4816.425)
R-squared	0.026	0.027	0.028
BIC	75085.52	75097.67	75342.42
p	0.0000	0.0000	0.0000
N	2528	2528	2528
t*N	14749	14749	14749

Model 2 includes all interaction effects for other covariates in the model, not shown

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$

Table 4: Results from Fixed Effects Regression Models of Marital Quality for First Marriages, by Gender Attitude

	1
Wife-to-Couple Income Ratio	1.126*
	(0.540)
Family/Gender Attitudes (Nontraditional ref.)	—
Normative	-1.602**
	(0.612)
Traditional	-0.762
	(0.991)
Wife's Total Income	0.000***
	(0.000)
Age - Wife	-0.047
	(0.256)
Weeks Worked Last Year - Wife	-0.005
	(0.007)
Weeks Worked Last Year - Husband	0.001
	(0.015)
Family Poverty Status (Not In Poverty ref.)	—
In Poverty	-0.911
	(0.788)
Missing	-0.144
	(0.348)
Received Welfare Last Year	1.102
	(0.841)
Marital Lenght (0-3 Years ref.)	—
3-6 Years	-1.262**
	(0.463)
6-9 Years	-1.955***
	(0.556)
9+ Years	-1.776**
	(0.555)
Number of Children (Childless ref.)	—
1 Child	-1.024**
	(0.348)
2 Children	-1.502***
	(0.332)
+3 Children	-1.795***
	(0.522)
Year	22.079
	(11.902)
Quadratic Year	-0.006
	(0.003)
Constant	-2.50e+04***
	(5225.587)
R-squared	0.028
BIC	62508.1
p	0.0000
N	1931
t*N	12173

Model 2 includes all interaction effects for other covariates in the model, not shown

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$