Multiplying Diversity: Family Unification and the Regional Origins of Late-Age Immigrants, 1981– 2009

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Abstract:

We analyze administrative data about new legal permanent residents for the period 1981-2009 to investigate the mechanisms driving two unintended consequences of the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality act: (1) the surge in Asian immigration and (2) the gradual increase in late-age migration. Using an indicator of family unification migration that allows for variation in the size of new LPR cohorts by regional origins, age and visa categories, we show that between 1981 and 1996, every 100 initiating immigrants from Asia directly or indirectly sponsored between 220 and 255 relatives, of whom between 46 and 51 were ages 50 and above; from 1996 through 2000, Asian family unification migration spiked such that each 100 initiating immigrants sponsored nearly 400 relatives, with one-in-four ages 50+. Regional comparisons and analyses of the top four sending countries show direct links between specific policies and the age composition of family unification migration.

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> *This bill that we will sign today is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives or add importantly to our wealth and power…this Bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here.*
> -Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965[1]

In hindsight, it seems odd that the sponsors of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 would claim that the legislation would have limited impacts on the nation. That was certainly the intention, but definitely not the result. At the height of the civil rights movement, President Johnson's vision of the Great Society that demanded ending poverty and racial injustice resonated with proponents of immigration reform. Notwithstanding the desire to eliminate the racist quota system that virtually excluded Asians and gave preference to Europeans, it is clear that Congress did not appreciate the magnitude of the changes it was writing into law. Given the long-term restrictions on Asian immigration, for example, few anticipated that the number of immigrants from Asia would surpass that from Latin America by 1978 and exceed a quarter of a million annually between 1981 and 1999.[2]

Contrary to President Johnson's claims when he signed the 1965 immigration reform legislation, history shows that the 1965 Amendments had far-reaching unintended consequences both for the demographic contours of immigration streams and the ethno-racial makeup of the U.S. population (Reimers 1992; Hirschman, 2005). The changed regional origins of U.S. immigrants since 1970 have been extensively documented (Reimers

[1]Cf. Kennedy, 1966, p.148.
[2] 1988 *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, Table 3.

1985; 1992; Smith and Edmonston 1997), but there is limited research illustrating *how* the seemingly benign provisions of the 1965 Amendments fostered enabled the massive transformation of U.S. immigration toward a preponderance of Asian and Latin American origin nations. Research addressing changes in the age composition of the immigrant streams is scarcer still, except for a spate of studies in the late 1990s that evaluated the consequences for immigrants of welfare reform (Fix and Passel, 1999; Friedland and Pankaj, 1997).

Like Reimers (1983; 1992), we argue that the architects of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act seriously underestimated the power of family networks as drivers of future immigration momentum from new origin countries, especially for nations with weak sending histories. Furthermore, in their zeal to promote family unity, Congress aggravated population aging by adding parents of U.S. citizens to the uncapped family relatives. To make our case we estimate the multiplicative impact of the family unification provisions by regional origins, age and sponsorship categories. Specifically, using administrative data about new legal permanent residents, we address three questions that undergird changes in the age, regional origins and admission auspices of immigrants admitted since 1980. First, how has the age composition of LPRs changed since 1980 by region and for the top sending countries? Second, how has family chain migration changed over time and according to region of origin, and to what extent has chain migration altered the age composition of immigration? Third, what family visa categories are responsible for late age migration and how do these differ by region? To address these questions we estimate a family migration multiplier that portrays the number of additional immigrants that are associated with initiating non-family immigrants.

Prior to discussing the data and measures, we provide a brief background of the legislative considerations that led to the gross miscalculation of the impact of the 1965

Amendments and explain why relatively few studies have studied the family multipliers driving changes in the ethno-racial and age composition of contemporary immigration. Following a brief overview of the data used to estimate the multiplicative effect of family unification migration, we present estimates of family unification multipliers by country of origin and age. The concluding section discusses the policy implications with reference to health care and comprehensive immigration reform.

Legislative Background: Sentimental Myopia or Factual Naïveté

Buttressed by the vision of a Great Society and a robust economy, Congress passed major social legislation to combat poverty and social injustice, including the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, the Medicare and Medicaid systems, and the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act. Notwithstanding a philosophical commitment to end the racist quota system that gave preference to European migrants and virtually excluded peoples from Asia and Africa, several members of Congress worried that proposed reforms would change the ethnic mix of the country (Reimers 1983; 1992; Tienda 2002). According to Senator Edward Kennedy (1966:145), who at the time chaired the hearings of the Subcommittee on Immigration, there were specific concerns "that the bill would greatly increase annual immigration, would contribute to increased unemployment and relief rolls, would ease the bar to the entry of security risks, and would permit excessive entry of persons from Africa and Asia." Having ended the Bracero Program just the year before, there was no appetite for admitting unskilled workers; therefore the legislation reforms targeted highly skilled workers and changed visa preferences to favor family unification.[3]

[3]Congress allocated 27,000 visas each for third preference, designated "for members of the professions of exceptional ability and their spouses and children" and sixth preference for "workers in skilled or unskilled occupations in which laborers are in short supply" (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990: 40).

Proponents of the 1965 Amendments reasoned—naively in retrospect—that elimination of quotas would not result in "excessive entry of persons from Africa and Asia" because the family preference categories would favor peoples of European stock. Owing to the exclusion of Chinese and Japanese laborers during the late 19th and early 20th century and the restrictions on immigration from the Asia-Pacific triangle imposed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, architects of the family preferences assumed limited availability of Asians to sponsor relatives from abroad. At the time, Asians represented about one percent of the U.S. population (Hirschman, 2005:Table 1). Reporting to the House subcommittee on immigration, chaired by his brother Senator Edward Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy reported that "5,000 immigrants would come in the first year, but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that" (Reimers, 1983:16). Anxious to marshal the immigration reform agenda envisioned by the late President Kennedy, Senator Kennedy also assured skeptics that the ethnic mix of the country would not be upset (Tienda, 2002: 591-2). That reformers did not appreciate the force of social ties in driving future flows proved highly consequential for the composition of U.S. immigration; however, it was not the family unification visas that would initially drive Asian immigration, but rather the employment visas, limited though they were (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Reimers 1992). Not only did Asian immigration surge, partly owing to the huge refugee flows from Indochina, but for ten consecutive years beginning in 1978 and again since 2010, Asian immigration surpassed that from Latin America (Nowrasteh, 2012).

Discussion about the numerical limits also had ethnic undertones, not only with regard to Asia, but also Latin America. Assuming, albeit erroneously, that the primary beneficiaries of the uncapped family unification provision would hail from Europe, Congress faced two key decisions—how to set the annual limits and whether to impose caps on both

the Western and Eastern Hemisphere. Both to avoid further appearance of prejudicial quotas and to address concerns about potential future demand for visas from Latin America, Congress imposed limits on both hemispheres. Although Hispanics comprised less than five percent of the U.S. population at the time (Bean and Tienda, 1987) and thus did not appear to represent huge future demand for family unification visas, there was growing concern about rapid population growth in the region. Reformers never imagined that 35 years later Hispanics would become the largest ethnic group or that unauthorized immigration could surpass legal immigration in any given year (Passel 2005).

Notwithstanding provisions to cap immigration, architects of the 1965 reforms vastly underestimated the significance of exempting immediate relatives of U.S. citizens from the hemispheric ceilings. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act exempted spouses and dependent children of U.S. citizens from the annual ceilings; however, in their zeal to promote family unification, reformers expanded the exempt category to include parents of U.S. citizens.[4] It is doubtful that any data analysis supported the final policy decisions. Even today, largely owing to data constraints, there are only few studies that directly link the visa preference system, including exempt family categories, to changes the composition of new immigrants (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986; 1989; GAO 1988; Reimers 1992; Yu, 2008).

Establishing links between family unification entitlements and the composition of future immigration flows ideally requires longitudinal data spanning at least one generation (preferably two) along with information about visa type and sponsors, among other characteristics. No existing data meet these requirements now much less in the early 1960s; however, using a combination of census and administrative data, a few studies have

[4] The decision to add parents to the exempt category appears to have been grounded on sentimental considerations rather than a policy analysis. In fact, Senator Kennedy saw the 1965 Amendments as a first step toward broadening the family unification provisions. In 1969 he introduced a bill to raise the worldwide ceiling to 300,000, exclusive of family members, and also amplify family unification by adding parents of permanent residents to the second preference. Had the bill become law, many of the unintended demographic consequences of the 1965 Amendments would be even greater.

used synthetic cohort methods to link family unification chain migration with the changing ethno-racial and age composition of immigration streams since 1970. We briefly summarize the methodological approaches, findings and limitations of these studies before illustrating empirically how chained migration is responsible for shifts in the regional origin and age composition of new immigrants.

Ethnic composition of immigration streams

Contrary to expectations of immigration reformers, once entry restrictions were lifted in 1965, Asian immigration surged. Asian nations contributed the largest numbers of non-family immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s, most of whom entered either as skilled employees or government-sponsored refugees after the fall of U.S.-backed governments in Southeast Asia (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989; 1990). That employment visas were capped at less than 30,000 annually initially kept Asian immigration in check, but only temporarily because labor migrants proved especially adept in sponsoring relatives. Using published data for legal permanent immigrants admitted in 1985, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) examine nativity differentials in sponsorship rates of spouses and parents—two relatives exempted from the numerical caps. They show that foreign-born residents were *four times* more likely to sponsor immigrant spouses than native-born citizens, with Mexico, Philippines, Korea, China and the Dominican Republic among the top five beneficiaries of the entitlement, and that the highest parent sponsorship rates corresponded to naturalized citizens, but Asians in particular. Owing to data limitations, Jasso and Rosenzweig were unable to consider sponsorship of capped family preferences; however, their insights about the sponsorship behavior of noncitizens suggests that family chain migration, rather than employment preferences, was the major driver of the dramatic growth of Asian immigration.

Latin American pathways to U.S. residence differed for several reasons. Until hemispheric ceilings were imposed on the Western hemisphere, Latin American

immigration was relatively unrestricted; in fact, the 1924 act explicitly exempted the countries of Central and South America from the quota system, which was designed to curtail immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe (Tienda, 2002). Three sets of circumstances permitted the activation of family chain migration from Latin America after the 1965 reforms went into effect: 1) the sizable U.S.-born Mexican-American population eligible to sponsor relatives; 2) a long tradition of labor migration; and 3) lax border enforcement, which permitted Mexican workers to cross liberally for seasonal farm work both during and after the termination of the Bracero Program. Although the 1965 Amendments imposed annual ceilings for both hemispheres, until 1978 no country-limits were imposed on the western hemisphere. Mexico consumed one-quarter and one-third of all visas allocated to the Americas during the 1960s and 1970s, respectively (US DHS, 2011:Table 2). According to Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) the 1978 law, which brought both hemispheres under a worldwide ceiling and extended the annual country limits to all nations, raised naturalization incentives for Western hemisphere immigrants in order to take advantage of the family unification entitlements.

More than any other country, Mexico witnessed the largest reduction in annual visas following enactment the 1978 Worldwide Ceiling Law. Not surprisingly, with the legal pathway sharply curtailed, unauthorized entry from Mexico surged. That the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act legalized nearly three million immigrants, the majority from Latin America, proved consequential for the future composition of family migration by dramatically increasing the pool of legal residents eligible to sponsor relatives in the future. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) claim that both employment and government-sponsored immigrants—refugees and legalized immigrants—have the highest sponsorship rates partly because they are unlikely to have many U.S. relatives. Therefore, we expect that the

legalization program substantially increased family unification migration from Latin America during the late 1990s and into the 21st century.

Age composition of immigrant streams

Had Congress been concerned about population aging in 1965, they would not have added parents to the exempt family category and possibly would have considered imposing an age cap on employment and family migrants, as Australia does. In that year, just fewer than nine percent of all persons granted LPR status were ages 50 and over (two percent ages 65 and over), which was comparable to the average for the 1962-71 period (U.S. DoJ, 1971: Table 10). Published statistics for legal permanent immigrants reveal a sharp increase in the number of exempt relatives admitted since 1965. Between 1967 and 1971, for example, the number of exempt relatives admitted rose from 47 to 81 thousand, of which parents represented 11 percent in 1971 (U.S. DOJ, 1971:Table 4).[5] In 1981, over 151,000 exempt family relatives were granted LPR status, with parents comprising 22 percent of the total (U.S. DOJ, 1981:Table 4A). By 2010, the number of exempt relatives admitted to LPR status skyrocketed to nearly 475,000, with parents accounting for nearly one in four immediate family members (U.S. DHS, 2011:Table 6).[6]

That most immigrants are in their prime working ages or younger likely deflected research attention to the growth of late age migration. Even as the baby boom approaches retirement age and concerns about the solvency of Social Security rise, surprisingly few studies have focused on the growth of late-age migration. He (2002) shows that between 1960 and 2000, the *number* of foreign-born residents ages 65 and over was stable at around three million; however, between 1990 and 2010, the number of foreign-born seniors (aged

[5] The published statistics do not tabulate age by class of admission by age, hence it is not possible to ascertain how much parent admissions contributed to late-age admissions.

[6] Although the size of the exempt cohort varied appreciably during the most recent decade—from a low of 331,286 in 2003 to a high of 580,348 in 2006—the parent share rose gradually from less than 18 percent in 2001 to 24 percent in 2010 (U.S. DHS, 2011:Table 6).

65 and over) nearly doubled, rising from 2.7 million to almost five million (Batalova, 2012). Two mechanisms drive the growth of the elderly foreign born population: aging of adults who arrived during their prime working years, and sponsorship of elderly parents by legal permanent residents who acquire citizenship. Because Europe was the major source of U.S. immigrants until the 1960s, they comprise the largest group of foreign-born seniors (Terrazas, 2009).

A recent study by Carr and Tienda (2012) shows that immigration of seniors has been rising largely due to increases in the number of numerically exempt parents of U.S. citizens, and to a lesser extent sponsored relatives and refugees. Using administrative data for new cohorts of legal permanent immigrants supplemented with special tabulations from the Department of Homeland Security, they determined that every 100 initiating immigrants admitted between 1981-85 sponsored an average of 260 family members, compared with an average of 345 for initiating immigrants admitted between 1996 and 2000. Furthermore, the number of family migrants ages 50 and over rose from 44 to 74 per 100 initiating migrants. Their analysis of chained migration did not consider the regional origins sponsored migrants, hence they were unable to empirically validate Jasso and Rosenzweig's (1989: 884) argument that parent sponsorship is "an overwhelmingly an Asian phenomenon."[7]

Data and Methods

We use the *Immigrants Admitted to the United States* (micro-data) (U.S. Department of Justice 2007) supplemented with special tabulations from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS) to examine changes in the age composition of immigrant

[7] The Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics does publish the age distribution of legal permanent residents in the aggregate and broken down by sex, but age distributions are not tabulated by visa categories or regions of origin.

cohorts since 1981. The micro-data file consists of records for all LPR admissions between 1981 and 2000, including persons present in the United States who adjusted their status to permanent resident during those years but excluding the 2.7 million immigrants granted legal permanent resident status by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. We augment the *Immigrants Admitted* data with two sets of summary tabulations: (1) for LPR admissions for the period 2001-2009, including both new arrivals and status adjustments; and (2) for IRCA legalization admissions for the period 1989-2000.[8]

Both data sources include several items that are necessary to derive age-, cohort- and origin-specific measures of chain migration, including year of admission, age (or age group) at admission, visa admission category (detailed or aggregated), and country or region of origin. The pooled data consist of a multi-dimensional table that cross-classifies admission age, admission year, admission class, and regional (country) origin. Specifically, the analysis file consists of 51,210 observations with (Age*Year*Sponsorship*Origin) count data over 29 years that represent nearly 25.5 million legal permanent residents admitted to the United States between 1981 and 2009. Each observation is a frequency count of admissions for the given set of age, year, sponsorship, and origin values. In this classification, admission years are aggregated into 5-year cohorts, from 1981-1985; origin is grouped into either five broad regions (Africa; Asia; Europe; North America; and South America and Oceania[9]) or the top-four source countries (China, India, the Philippines, and Mexico); and age at arrival is aggregated into three broad categories: 0-16 (youth), 17-49 (working ages), and 50+ (late-ages).

A key requirement for our estimates of chain migration is class of admission, which

[8] These tabulations were obtained as a custom request from U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS).

[9] We would prefer to classify Oceania with Europe but the aggregated tabulations we obtained did not permit us to reallocate these LPRs. The numbers are relatively small and the allocation decision is inconsequential for our estimates.

is not available on population-based surveys. Following Carr and Tienda (2012) and Yu (2008), we collapse 352 specific visa classes into 10 exhaustive categories that represent the major admission classes. Importantly, these major classes differentiate between (1) initiating versus family unification immigrants; (2) accompanying versus later-sponsored family immigrants; (3) citizen- versus LPR-sponsored family immigrants; and (4) numerically-capped versus uncapped immigrants.

Pivotal to this classification are *initiating immigrants*, who comprise all LPRs *not* sponsored by a family migrant. More generally, initiating immigrants are the first in their families to move to the United States, and they must be either sponsored by nonfamily entities or marry a native-born U.S. citizen. The upper panel of Figure 1 presents the initiating immigrant aggregated classes; they are denoted by the subscript "0", and letters E, G, and S designate employer, government and spouse sponsors.

Figure 1 About Here

In contrast to initiating immigrants, *family unification immigrants* consist of all LPRs sponsored by family members who themselves are immigrants (both naturalized and legal resident aliens) or who are an initiating immigrant's accompanying family members.[10] The lower panel of Figure 1 presents the four types of family immigrants: (1) family dependents who accompany initiating immigrants; (2) later following dependents of initiating LPRs (admitted under numerically-capped family 2nd preferences); (3) U.S. citizens' numerically-uncapped immediate relatives including spouses, minor children and parents; and (4) U.S. citizens' numerically-capped preference relatives including adult citizens' married and unmarried offspring and siblings and their respective dependents (admitted under

[10] Unlike the USDHS use of the term "family immigrants," which reflects LPRs admitted as U.S. citizens' immediate relatives or under family-sponsored preferences, we also include as "family immigrants" the accompanying family dependents of initiating immigrants (Monger 2010: 2). For example, we characterize the accompanying family members of an employer-sponsored initiating immigrant as family immigrants, whereas USDHS classifies them under employment-based preferences admissions.

numerically-limited family 1st, 3rd or 4th preferences). Antecedent subscripts 1 through 4 indicate migration phase, i.e., the sequence in the migration chain.

Only initiating immigrants can start new migration chains; new chains are activated when spouses and children accompany initiating immigrants or when initiating immigrants sponsor spouses, minor children or unmarried adult offspring, subject to numerical caps, or, contingent upon naturalization, immediate relatives. After meeting age and/or citizenship requirements, family immigrants, too, can sponsor family members and activate the multiplicative properties of chained migration (Yu 2008; Carr and Tienda 2012).

Using these variables we estimate a series of *family migration multipliers*, which are a measure of the intensity of family chain migration relative to the volume of initiating immigrants**.** Expressed in formulaic terms, the age-, origin-, and cohort-specific family migration multiplier is

$$FMM_{jkt} = \frac{\Sigma\ {}_1D_{jkt} + {}_2D_{jkt} + {}_3S_{jkt'} + {}_3C_{jkt'} + {}_3P_{jkt'} + {}_4F_{jkt'}}{\Sigma\ {}_0E_{j'kt} + {}_0G_{j'kt} + {}_0G'_{j'kt} + {}_0S_{j'kt}}$$

where the terms in the numerator represent counts of specific types of sponsored family migrants, and the denominator terms represent the counts of each type of initiating immigrant. Each term's core notation consists of an upper case letter and a leading subscript 0-4 that in combination represent an aggregated class of admission. Specifically, ${}_0E$, ${}_0G$, ${}_0G'$, and ${}_0S$ denominator terms are employer sponsored, government sponsored and spouse initiating immigrants. The numerator reflects initiating immigrants' accompanying and later-following family dependents (${}_1D$ and ${}_2D$); U.S. citizens' numerically-exempt spouses, children and parents (${}_3S$, ${}_3C$ and ${}_3P$); and U.S. citizens' adult offspring and siblings and respective dependents (${}_4F$).

Subscript *j* denotes one of the three age groups at admission (<17, 17-49 or 50+) among family unification immigrants. Subscript *j'*, which is applied to the initiating

immigrant terms, indicates all ages. The subscript *k* signifies region of origin (Asia, Africa, Europe, North America, or both South America and Oceania) or, in more detailed analyses, a top sending country of origin (China, India, Philippines, or Mexico). Subscripts *t* and *t'* reflect five-year admission cohorts corresponding, respectively, to the early and later stages of the migration chain. For initiating immigrants and their accompanying and later-following dependents ($_1$D and $_2$D unification migrants), admission cohort *t* consists of one of the following cohorts: 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, or 1996-2000. Subscript *t'* is applied to numerically-exempt immediate relatives ($_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P) and citizens' family preference relatives ($_4$F) in order to approximate the timing of naturalization and eligibility for citizen-based sponsorship among initiating immigrants from cohort *t* such that $t' = t + 9$; this lag reflects the average eight year duration in LPR status plus an additional year for visa processing delays. The family migration multiplier is further detailed in Carr (forthcoming).

Results

The analyses are completed (see attached tables and figures) and highlighted in the abstract. We are currently drafting the results sections, which are organized to illustrate regional variations in family unification chain migration and its late-age component, and subsequently the contributions of the four largest immigrant-sending nations—China, India, the Philippines, and Mexico.

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Table 1

New Legal Permanent Immigrants Admitted by Region of Origin, Age at Admission and 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009

Region of Origin/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
Asia	(n=1,350,448)	(n=1,414,772)	(n=1,661,277)	(n=1,253,290)	(n=1,658,069)	(n=1,618,588)
0-16	25.1	21.1	19.6	19.5	15.7	15.9
17-49	61.0	61.6	62.5	61.7	67.4	64.3
50+	13.9	17.3	17.8	18.8	16.9	19.7
North America	(n=881,648)	(n=2,239,907)	(n=2,397,916)	(n=1,499,658)	(n=1,729,727)	(n=1,506,105)
0-16	26.4	16.2	16.5	25.7	18.6	18.9
17-49	65.4	74.8	75.6	60.9	67.4	64.4
50+	8.2	9.0	7.9	13.4	14.0	16.7
Europe	(n=321,133)	(n=385,150)	(n=670,698)	(n=518,750)	(n=679,782)	(n=449,391)
0-16	19.8	17.7	19.4	20.3	19.2	14.2
17-49	67.6	70.0	64.6	64.2	67.3	69.2
50+	12.6	12.3	16.0	15.5	13.6	16.6
South America and Oceania	(n=198,576)	(n=286,757)	(n=300,662)	(n=276,410)	(n=398,739)	(n=468,442)
0-16	23.4	19.4	20.6	21.1	17.3	15.7
17-49	67.2	68.6	67.3	65.3	68.2	67.9
50+	9.4	11.9	12.1	13.6	14.6	16.4
Africa	(n=76,989)	(n=115,261)	(n=160,012)	(n=221,103)	(n=311,362)	(n=437,013)
0-16	13.9	11.8	16.5	19.1	16.9	18.2
17-49	80.5	81.6	75.1	71.8	73.5	69.8
50+	5.6	6.6	8.5	9.1	9.6	12.0

Source: Author's tabulation from *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ, *Immigrants Admitted to the United States, 1981-2000*, 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Table 2
Summary of Family Migration Multipliers by Region of Origin, Age at Admission, and 5-Year Initiating Immigrant Cohort, 1981-2000

Initiating Cohort	Initiating Immigrants (n)	Family Migrants (n)	*Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission*			
			<17	17-49	50+	All
Asia						
1981-1985	472,080	1,044,320	0.55	1.16	0.51	2.21
1986-1990	403,160	1,033,399	0.66	1.40	0.51	2.56
1991-1995	526,489	1,222,461	0.58	1.28	0.46	2.32
1996-2000	301,427	1,192,213	0.87	2.03	1.06	3.95
North America						
1981-1985	221,260	765,742	1.09	1.98	0.39	3.46
1986-1990	1,497,026	921,425	0.18	0.34	0.10	0.62
1991-1995	1,380,413	1,329,522	0.30	0.52	0.15	0.96
1996-2000	312,381	1,313,381	1.23	2.22	0.75	4.20
Europe						
1981-1985	128,235	228,878	0.44	1.13	0.22	1.78
1986-1990	178,928	208,684	0.33	0.70	0.14	1.17
1991-1995	308,902	373,634	0.38	0.66	0.17	1.21
1996-2000	215,868	359,383	0.46	0.89	0.32	1.67
South America and Oceania						
1981-1985	37,758	195,245	1.30	3.07	0.81	5.17
1986-1990	101,633	224,133	0.58	1.32	0.31	2.21
1991-1995	88,967	284,426	0.84	1.86	0.49	3.20
1996-2000	61,239	325,445	1.21	3.02	1.09	5.31
Africa						
1981-1985	29,967	66,377	0.43	1.49	0.32	2.24
1986-1990	57,603	86,784	0.32	0.94	0.24	1.51
1991-1995	70,866	117,934	0.41	1.01	0.24	1.66
1996-2000	88,261	201,708	0.59	1.27	0.42	2.29

Source: Author's tabulations from *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by the U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: We assume a 9-year lag between permanent residency and naturalization, which is a condition for sponsoring numerically-exempt immediate relatives and some family preference migrants. The $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F cohorts are advanced by nine years to reflect this lag, and the 1981-1985 initiating cohort corresponds to 1990-1994 $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F family admissions, etc.

Table 3

New Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age at Admission: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009

Origin Country/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(n=126,689)	(n=135,923)	(n=222,430)	(n=177,277)	(n=250,964)	(n=289,748)
0-16	15.7	13.2	12.1	16.5	12.3	10.5
17-49	55.5	54.2	64.5	60.2	65.0	66.8
50+	28.8	32.6	23.4	23.3	22.7	22.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
India	(n=117,608)	(n=134,510)	(n=173,176)	(n=189,005)	(n=343,618)	(n=246,044)
0-16	17.2	16.1	17.2	16.0	11.8	12.7
17-49	65.6	62.6	62.6	63.2	73.1	65.6
50+	17.1	21.3	20.1	20.8	15.1	21.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Philippines	(n=219,319)	(n=255,750)	(n=280,475)	(n=211,425)	(n=266,637)	(n=260,174)
0-16	21.5	21.4	21.9	19.7	18.9	19.3
17-49	56.5	57.6	57.7	57.9	60.9	56.4
50+	22.0	20.9	20.4	22.4	21.2	24.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mexico	(n=334,507)	(n=1,320,175)	(n=1,488,140)	(n=757,593)	(n=875,719)	(n=575,561)
0-16	26.9	12.8	11.4	29.0	18.0	18.4
17-49	67.6	79.6	82.3	57.3	67.2	63.6
50+	5.6	7.6	6.3	13.8	14.8	18.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Author's tabulation from *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ, *Immigrants Admitted to the United States, 1981-2000*, 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. Because of data anomalies, this table excludes IRCA amnesty immigrants from tabulations for China, India, and the Philippines.

Table 4
Summary of Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission and 5-Year Initiating Immigrant Cohorts: Top Four Sending Countries, 1981-2000

Initiating Cohort	Initiating Immigrants (n)	Family Migrants (n)	*Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission*			
			<17	17-49	50+	All
China						
1981-1985	16,197	124,139	0.89	3.86	2.91	7.67
1986-1990	14,048	118,369	1.05	4.67	2.71	8.43
1991-1995	79,134	173,466	0.37	1.18	0.65	2.19
1996-2000	32,521	202,944	1.06	3.15	2.03	6.24
India						
1981-1985	12,825	127,998	1.78	5.55	2.65	9.98
1986-1990	15,370	147,538	1.61	5.59	2.40	9.60
1991-1995	29,086	169,794	1.05	3.30	1.49	5.84
1996-2000	36,162	184,830	0.81	2.62	1.69	5.11
Philippines						
1981-1985	36,569	217,329	1.38	3.11	1.45	5.94
1986-1990	47,110	180,656	0.93	1.92	0.99	3.84
1991-1995	51,059	206,017	1.00	2.08	0.96	4.04
1996-2000	39,568	200,769	1.08	2.33	1.66	5.07
Mexico						
1981-1985	124,385	233,377	0.60	1.06	0.22	1.88
1986-1990	1,093,752	316,008	0.07	0.15	0.07	0.29
1991-1995	1,084,947	686,966	0.18	0.34	0.11	0.63
1996-2000	102,647	654,398	2.01	3.25	1.12	6.38

Source: Author's tabulations from *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: We assume a 9-year lag between permanent residency and naturalization, which is a condition for sponsoring numerically uncapped immediate relatives and some family preference migrants. The $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F cohorts are advanced by nine years to reflect this lag, and the 1981-1985 initiating cohort corresponds to 1990-1994 $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F family admissions, etc.

Table 5

Sponsored Parent ($_3$P) New Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age at Arrival: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009

Country of Origin/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(n=22,229)	(n=27,742)	(n=33,695)	(n=26,619)	(n=36,949)	(n=39,062)
0-16	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17-49	2.9	2.1	2.7	3.2	1.2	1.8
50+	97.1	97.9	97.3	96.8	98.8	98.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
India	(n=17,127)	(n=23,988)	(n=27,627)	(n=26,907)	(n=32,201)	(n=38,071)
0-16	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17-49	4.6	5.4	5.9	5.0	3.7	3.8
50+	95.4	94.6	94.1	95.0	96.3	96.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Philippines	(n=39,710)	(n=41,451)	(n=38,767)	(n=29,642)	(n=31,427)	(n=40,136)
0-16	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17-49	4.5	4.3	5.2	4.8	3.4	3.7
50+	95.5	95.7	94.8	95.2	96.6	96.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mexico	(n=10,023)	(n=19,576)	(n=22,342)	(n=87,215)	(n=115,261)	(n=89,769)
0-16	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
17-49	16.7	12.9	13.3	10.4	13.5	13.2
50+	83.2	87.1	86.7	89.6	86.5	86.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Author's tabulation from *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Table 6

Family Preference ($_2$D, $_4$F) New Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age At Arrival: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009

Country of Origin/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(n=76,439)	(n=81,311)	(n=61,370)	(n=62,150)	(n=62,378)	(n=59,250)
0-16	22.3	19.3	18.4	19.5	17.6	18.9
17-49	66.6	66.0	66.0	61.8	59.2	58.3
50+	11.0	14.7	15.7	18.7	23.2	22.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
India	(n=78,156)	(n=79,319)	(n=80,381)	(n=81,264)	(n=70,719)	(n=58,028)
0-16	21.3	22.2	27.0	25.8	20.0	22.1
17-49	74.7	71.7	63.7	59.7	57.4	58.4
50+	4.1	6.1	9.3	14.5	22.7	19.5
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Philippines	(n=78,969)	(n=78,745)	(n=79,360)	(n=73,371)	(n=75,007)	(n=57,639)
0-16	24.9	25.1	26.0	26.4	27.2	27.3
17-49	67.8	67.2	62.6	56.0	50.2	49.3
50+	7.3	7.7	11.4	17.6	22.6	23.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mexico	(n=92,065)	(n=83,699)	(n=186,143)	(n=369,372)	(n=289,247)	(n=188,654)
0-16	36.6	29.9	41.5	42.4	30.4	29.1
17-49	61.1	67.1	53.4	52.5	63.9	64.9
50+	2.3	3.0	5.1	5.2	5.7	6.1
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Author's tabulation from *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: Tabulations reflect immigrants admitted under family first through fourth preference categories, including aggregated admissions classes $_2$D (later-following LPR dependents (2nd preference)) and $_4$F (adult sons and daughters (1st and 3rd preferences) and siblings (4th preference), with associated dependents, of adult U.S. citizens). The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

Table 7

Government-Sponsored ($_0$G, $_1$D) Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age at Admission: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009

Origin Country/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(n=5,672)	(n=3,540)	(n=8,918)	(n=3,644)	(n=9,097)	(n=88,617)
0-16	4.3	3.5	20.5	27.1	12.8	9.7
17-49	29.3	18.4	68.5	66.5	74.5	80.4
50+	66.3	78.1	11.1	6.4	12.7	10.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
India	(n=968)	(n=1,237)	(n=4,587)	(n=2,990)	(n=8,637)	(n=16,175)
0-16	69.2	61.4	46.3	24.6	23.0	20.9
17-49	28.1	30.1	49.8	68.6	67.4	68.7
50+	2.7	8.5	3.8	6.9	9.6	10.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Philippines	(n=2,059)	(n=7,345)	(n=11,773)	(n=1,572)	(n=1,119)	(n=1,529)
0-16	85.7	35.2	30.7	23.4	29.9	44.2
17-49	10.8	56.5	66.5	61.6	49.2	37.9
50+	3.5	8.3	2.8	15.0	21.0	17.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Mexico	(n=63,489)	(n=1,025,489)	(n=1,149,897)	(n=14,879)	(n=22,543)	(n=22,040)
0-16	44.6	10.8	5.8	17.3	6.7	5.8
17-49	48.9	81.7	88.8	76.6	84.9	83.1
50+	6.5	7.5	5.3	6.0	8.5	11.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: Author's tabulation from *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: Tabulations reflect immigrants admitted under government auspices, including aggregated admissions classes $_0$G (government-sponsored initiating immigrants), $_0$G' (IRCA amnesty government-sponsored initiating immigrants), and $_1$D (accompanying dependents of government-sponsored initiating immigrants). The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.

FIGURE 1

Aggregated Class of Admission by Reunification Migration Phase

Family Unification Phase		Aggregated Class of Admission
Initiating Immigrants		
Phase 0	**Initiating Immigrants**	**$_0$E Employer-sponsored initiating employee immigrants (excluding dependents)** **$_0$G Government-sponsored initiating immigrants (excluding dependents, excluding IRCA).** **$_0$G' IRCA amnesty immigrants (special government sponsored initiating immigrants)** **$_0$S Initiating spouse immigrants (sponsored by *native-born* citizen spouses)**
Family Unification Immigrants: Accompanying and Sponsored		
Phase 1	**Accompanying Family Dependents of Initiating Immigrants**	**$_1$D Dependents (spouse or minor children) who accompany initiating immigrants at migration**
Phase 2	**Numerically-Limited, Later Following Family Dependents of Initiating Immigrants** ***Sponsored by LPRs under numerically-limited family 2nd preference admissions categories***	**$_2$D Numerically-limited, later-following dependents (spouses, minor children, unmarried adult offspring) of previously migration initiating immigrants**
Phase 3	**Numerically-Unlimited Immediate Relatives of U.S. Citizens** ***Sponsored by citizens under numerically-exempt admissions categories***	**$_3$S Spouses of *foreign-born* U.S. citizens (sponsored by naturalized citizen spouses)[1]** **$_3$C Children of U.S. citizens** **$_3$P Parents of U.S. citizens**
Phase 4	**Numerically-Limited Preference Relatives of U.S. Citizens** ***Sponsored by citizens under numerically-limited 1st, 3rd and 4th preferences***	**$_4$F Adult sons, daughters, and siblings, with associated dependents, of adult U.S. citizens[2]**

Source: Carr and Tienda, 2012.

Figure 2



Sources: *1986 and 1999 Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; 2011 Statistical Yearbook of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics.*

Figure 3



Sources: *US Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys, March 2000; IPUMS 1% sample, 1960; IPUMS-USA 2010 ACS sample; IPUMS 5% sample, 1980.*