Policy or Participation? Policy Environments, Labor Markets and Work-Family Conflict

Leah Ruppanner

University of Nebraska - Lincoln

201 13th St

Lincoln, NE 68588

lruppanner2@unl.edu

Abstract:

Boundaries between work and family are often porous contributing to inter-role strain. Individual-level approaches to work-family conflict are well theorized and empirically supported. However, less is known about how macro-level contextual factors structure individual level work-family conflict. This study fills this gap by (a) modeling conflict in two directions - from work-family and family-work; (b) situating these individual reports within the macro-level context of welfare state policy and labor market participation; (c) analyzing cross-level interactions by gender and parental status. To assess these relationships, I pair individual-level data from the 2002 International Social Survey Programme for more than 14,000 respondents in 29 countries with macro-level measures of policy (childcare enrollment and female parliamentary representation) and participation (percent of mothers' of a young child working full-time and mean full-time weekly work hours). The results demonstrate country-level policy and participation have differential effects by gender and parental status.

Today, many families are simultaneously balancing work and home demands. These dual-responsibilities are often associated with increased conflict between work and family (Hill, 2005; Hill, Yang, Hawkins, & Ferris, 2004; Rothbard, Phillips, & Dumas, 2005; Schieman, Glavin, & Milkie, 2009). Indeed, boundaries between work and family are often porous contributing to inter-role conflict which contributes to poor health outcomes (Glavin, Schieman, & Reid, 2011), depression and stress (Allen, Herst, Bruck, & Sutton, 2000). What is more, women and parents experience disproportionately higher conflict between work and family and are more vulnerable to negative health outcomes associated with this conflict (Glavin et al., 2011). To address these inequalities, many welfare states have instituted policies to empower women and alleviate parents' family burdens. Indeed, these two areas serve as foundations for country-level comparisons across welfare states and are frequently cited as representative of nations' family-friendliness (Esping-Andersen, 1990; Gornick & Meyers, 2003; Gornick et al., 1996; Leira, 1993) This body of research identifies gender equality in women's economic, political and familial positions as essential to the overall well-being of a nation's citizens. However, few studies have explicitly modeled these multi-level effects. This study is one step in that direction. Specifically, I apply cross-national data to address the question: does policy and labor market participation at the country-level structure work-family and family-work conflict at the individual level?

An emerging body of research investigates conflict between work and family in a cross-national perspective. Crompton and Lyonette (2006) compare respondents in Britain, France, Finland, Norway and Portugal and document work-family conflict patterns by welfare state regime. Specifically, the authors identify a societal effect for the Nordic welfare states, but the

sampling of five countries has limited generalizablity to a global sample and the models do not explicitly test cross-level effects. In response to this limitation, Ruppanner (2011) applies multi-level data to assess cross-level effects and finds parents report less family-work conflict in countries with more expansive parental leave policies. However, this study draws from a twelve country-sample which is methodologically limited. Finally, Edlund (2007) uses work-family conflict scores for respondents in 29 countries to identify work-family conflict regime clusters but neglects modeling multi-level effects. Taken together, these studies demonstrate the need for cross-national research on conflict between work and family but reflect important theoretical and methodological limitations.

This study fills these gaps as follows. First, I apply individual-level data from the 2002 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) which samples over 14,000 respondents in 29 nations to provide a diverse cross-national sample. Second, I pair these individual-level data with country-level measures expected to influence conflict for parents of a young child (childcare enrollment and percent of mothers' of a young child working full-time) and employees more generally (mean full-time work hours and female parliamentarian representation). Finally, I analyze work-family and family-work conflict separately as I expect policy to structure family-work and participation work-family conflict. The results contribute to a growing body of comparative cross-national work-family research.

THEORIZING CONFLICT AT THE COUNTRY-LEVEL

A major contribution of this research is situating work-family and family-work conflict within macro-level policy and labor market structure. A growing body of comparative research documents the importance of macro-level context in structuring individual-level behavior. From

this research, two patterns emerge: individuals have more equitable outcomes in countries where women are economically empowered and where family-responsive policies are more generous (Crompton & Lyonette, 2006; Fuwa, 2004; Fuwa & Cohen, 2007; Misra, Budig, & Boeckmann, 2011). From this research, I explore the relationships between work-family and family-work conflict and two measures of political variation (public childcare enrollment and female parliamentarian representation) and two measures of labor market participation (mean full-time work hours and percent of mothers' of a young child working full-time). I expect these measures to have particularly strong effects for women and parents of young children for whom family demands are highest but are also expected to have broader widespread effects for employed individuals. What is more, these measures are hypothesized to effect work-family and family-work conflict in distinct ways. Specific relationships are outlined in more detail below.

Policy Environments

This study applies two measures of political variation expected to have distinct effects on family-work and work-family conflict: public childcare enrollment and the percentage of female parliamentarians. Welfare states institute public childcare to provide parents with reliable and cost-effective care to encourage continuous maternal labor force participation. Indeed, mothers in countries with more expansive childcare are more likely to be employed, experience fewer employment interruptions, and report higher earnings (Leira, 1993; Misra et al., 2011; Orloff, 1993). However, this increase in maternal employment may be at the expense of greater conflict between work and family for both parents. Specifically, the increase in maternal employment indicates that more couples are juggling the dual-burdens of work and family which may contribute to conflict between these domains. In this respect, more expansive childcare policies may be positively associated with parents' overall stress and thus bi-directional conflict between

work and family. On the other hand, public childcare enrollment may affect conflict in one direction – from family-work – as the state assumes partial responsibility for family care. Indeed, welfare states enact public childcare measures in part to reduce family-to-work conflict by providing structured, reliable and consistent care (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). This study tests whether childcare policies are in fact associated with less family-work conflict for the intended population – parents of a young child.

In addition to childcare policies, welfare states enact a variety of measures aimed at reducing gender inequality including increasing women's representation in parliament. Indeed, women's political representation is so central to welfare state development that most emerging democracies institute quota systems to increase women's parliamentarian representation (Caul, 1999; Schmidt & Saunders, 2004). What is more, female parliamentarians are more likely to use their political power to create more family- and gender-responsive welfare states. Specifically, female parliamentarians are more likely to vote for and allocate money to social programs for working women and mothers (Bolzendahl, 2009). Further, female parliamentarians are more likely to propose and support anti-discriminatory policies to create a more gender egalitarian work environment (Caiazza, 2004 ; Carroll, 2001; Swers, 2002). Finally, female parliamentarians serve as role models who highlight the difficulties of balancing work and family demands (Campbell & Wolbrecht, 2006) which may have shift the cultural dialogue towards work-family issues. In sum, female parliamentarians use their political power to create a more worker-friendly welfare state that should benefit all workers through reduced work-family and family-work conflict. [i] Further, parents of a young child whose family demands are greatest may experience the greatest reductions in conflict associated with female representation.

Labor Market Structure

This study applies two measures to capture cultural expectations for individuals' work patterns. The first, mean full-time weekly work hours taps into normative expectations for work time. Many welfare states legislate maximum weekly work hours to create more family-responsive environments (Gornick & Meyers, 2003). However, maximum work hour regulation does not often reflect the actual number of hours individuals work as these policies can be aimed at specific populations (e.g. mothers of young children) or riddled with loopholes (Campbell, 2002). For these reasons, I apply a mean full-time weekly work hour measure to capture normative work hour expectations. Mean weekly work hours may have uni- or bi-directional effects on conflict. Longer normative expectations for work weeks may be positively associated with conflict in one direction - from work to family - as individuals are expected to make greater time investments in work. Indeed, shorter work weeks are shown to be associated with better health outcomes and less stress (Guest, 2002; Sparks, Cooper, Fried, & Shirom, 1997). By extension, living in a country with shorter normative work weeks may alleviate work-family conflict. Or, macro-level work hours may contribute to conflict in both directions as employees have less time to complete family demands. Employees in countries with longer normative weekly work hours may spend more time at work and thus increase their exposure to family interfering with work. Further, these effects may be greatest for parents of a young child for whom family demands are greatest. The models assess these relationships.

The percent of mothers with a young child working full-time measures mothers' labor market attachment but also reflects cultural attitudes towards work. In terms of participation, macro-level maternal labor market participation should have strong effects for mothers of young children. Specifically, mothers in countries with higher maternal labor market attachment may

feel pressured to work when children are young and family demands are high which may contribute to family-work conflict. What is more, fathers in high maternal labor force countries may have to shoulder larger family demands and by extension report higher family-work conflict. On the other hand, maternal labor force participation may have no effect on mothers' family-work conflict especially in countries with more expansive childcare enrollment as the state alleviates some family demands. While these relationships are theorized for parents of a young child, mothers' full-time labor force participation rates may have effects for all female workers. Specifically, high rates of maternal employment when children are young reflect broader patterns of continuous female labor force participation throughout all life stages. Indeed, Treas and Widmer (2000) identify work-oriented countries as those in which women's paid employment is preferred prior to, upon the birth of and when children are school aged. In this respect, higher rates of full-time maternal employment when children are young may reflect broader cultural preferences for women's continuous full-time employment. This expectation may contribute to work-family conflict for female workers regardless of parental status. This paper explores these relationships.

DATA, MEASURES AND MODELS

This study applies the 2002 International Social Survey Programme data on Family and Changing Gender Roles. This is the third wave of this module and includes data from respondents in a range of nations. This study samples respondents from Australia, Austria, Brazil, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Israel, Japan, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Northern Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russia, Slovenia, Slovakian Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States. The Philippines and Taiwan are excluded from the sample because they are missing

measures for the public childcare measure. Bulgaria, Ireland and New Zealand are excluded because they are missing for the child under five in the home measure. The sample is restricted to those who are aged 25 to 59, employed and complete on either the work-family or family-work conflict measures. The effective sample size is 14,396 respondents who reported a family-work conflict score and 14,176 for those with a work-family conflict score.

The data are analyzed using hierarchical linear models (HLM). HLM accounts for the nesting of individuals within macro contexts. Unlike OLS regressions which assume that the standard errors are randomly distributed, HLM estimates clustered standard errors at multiple-levels, in this case individuals within countries. By simultaneously estimating individual and country-level models, I am able to assess whether the policy and participation measures structure individual reports of work-family and family-work conflict net of individual-level controls. In addition, the models estimate cross-level effects for the gender and parenthood gaps.

Dependent Variables

This study applies two separate dependent measures: family-work and work-family conflict. Family-work conflict is the respondents' mean response to the following statements: (1) "I have found it difficult to concentrate at work because of my family responsibilities"; (2) "I have arrived at work too tired to function well because of the household work I had done" (alpha=0.74). Those missing on either of these measures were excluded from the sample. Responses are on a four-point scale ranging from never to several times a week with higher values reflecting greater reported family-work conflict.

Work-family conflict is the respondents' mean response to the following statements: (1) "It has been difficult for me to fulfill my family responsibilities because of the amount of time I

spend on my job"; (2) "I have come home from work too tired to do the chores which need to be done" (alpha=0.71). Respondents missing on either of these measures were excluded from the sample. Responses are on a four-point scale ranging from several times a week to never and higher values reflect greater reported family-work conflict

Country-Level Measures: Gender Empowerment and Family-Responsive Policies

The country-level measures are from three sources. The percent of female parliamentarians is from the 2002 United Nations Development Report (UNDR). The UNDR is compiled annually and includes measures of gender empowerment used in previous multi-level research (Batalova & Cohen, 2002; Fuwa, 2004; Ruppanner, 2010). The public childcare measure is compiled by Fuwa and Cohen (2007) who compute the mean for the percent of children under three and three to six in public childcare to capture average enrollment for children under school age. The labor market participation measures are aggregated from the 2002 ISSP. These measure the mean weekly work hours for full-time workers and the percentage of mothers of a young child (under five) who report working full-time. Table 1 provides the correlations between these macro-level measures. Countries with more female parliamentarians have lower mean full-time weekly work hours and more children enrolled in public childcare indicating that female parliamentarians are associated with a more family-responsive welfare state. Also, mothers' of a young child are less likely to be employed full-time in countries with longer full-time weekly work hours suggesting an incompatibility of work and family demands in these countries. None of the other macro-level measures are significantly correlated.

Main Independent Variables: Gender and Parenthood

To measure the differential effects of gender on work-family and family-work conflict, I include a measure of gender dichotomously coded (female=1). The *presence of children* is associated with greater housework and childcare responsibilities (Bianchi, Milkie, Sayer, & Robinson, 2000; Fuwa, 2004). These are measured dichotomously for the presence of a child five and under in the home (value=1) and the presence of a child six to seventeen in the home (value=1). These categories are not mutually exclusive. Gender interaction terms are also included for mothers of a young child (female x five and under present) and for mothers of older children (female x child six to seventeen present). These measures serve as main independent-level measures of interest and are explored in cross-level effects.

Home and Work Demands

Home demands include four individual-level characteristics expected to increase demands within the home. *Home stress* reflects the extent to which the respondent finds his/her home life stressful. Responses are on a five-point scale with higher values reflecting greater stress at home. *Home pressure* is respondents' agreement to the following statement: "There are so many things to do at home, I often run out of time before I get them all done." Responses are on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (value =1) to strongly agree (value=5). Respondents were asked how satisfied they are with their family lives with higher values reflecting greater *home dissatisfaction*. Finally, I include a measure for strong *attitudinal support for housework equality* to capture housework expectations. Respondents were asked to what extent they agreed with the following statement: "Men ought to do a larger share of the housework than they do now." I recoded the responses dichotomously to reflect strong

agreement to this statement (value=1). I am unable to include housework allocations as they are only asked of partnered respondents. Thus, to include actual divisions of housework would require restricting the sample to partnered individuals which limits the generalizabilty of the results. What is more, I expect macro-level policy and participation to affect all workers regardless of marital status and thus restricting the sample is theoretically limiting. For these reasons, I include the attitudinal measure, which is asked of all respondents, to capture variation in housework allocations. Indeed, married and cohabiting respondents who report performing more than their fair share of the housework also report stronger agreement to this attitudinal measure ($p<0.001$) indicating that the attitudinal measure captures inequality in housework divisions.

The work demands reflect individual characteristics that contribute to stress in the work domain. *Weekly work hours* are the number of hours the respondent works in a typical week. Job stress, dissatisfaction and pressure are measured on scale equivalent to home stress, dissatisfaction and pressure. Briefly, *job stress* reflects agreement to finding one's job stressful. Responses are on a five-point scale with higher values representing greater job stress. *Job dissatisfaction* is the extent to which respondents find their job dissatisfying with higher values reflecting greater job dissatisfaction. Finally, *job pressure* reflects agreement to the following statement: "There are so many things to do at work, I often run out of time before I get them all done." Responses are on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (value =1) to strongly agree (value=5).

Home and Work Resources

To capture the availability of help in the home, p*artner present* includes those who report living with a cohabiting or married partner dichotomously coded (partner present=1). Work resources are characteristics that provide the respondent with resources from their job. Respondents reported their current position which was coded based on the ILO/ISCO 1988 4-digit codes. Professional jobs as those with the greatest resources so those currently in a *professional* position (value=1) are included in the model (Schieman et al., 2009; Voydanoff, 2007). These positions include working as legislators, professionals or technicians (ILO codes 1 through 3999). *Supervisors* have greater control over the workplace environment and thus are coded dichotomously (value=1) for those who report supervising employees in their current job. To measure educational resources, I include a dichotomous measure for the *college educated* (completed a college degree or higher=1). Finally, the *household earnings scale* is used to capture economic variation in total household earnings across countries. Respondents were asked for their total family income in country-specific currency. This measure was standardized across countries on a zero to one scale so that the maximum reported value in each country serves as the cap. Those who are missing or refused to provide their income were deleted from the sample.

Demographic Controls

The models also control for age and age squared to account for a non-linear effect for age. I restricted the models to those aged 25 to 59 to reflect those in their most productive employment and reproductive years. Consistent with previous research, I expect age to be positively but non-linearly associated with work-family and family-work conflict (Grzywacz, Almeida, & McDonald, 2002).[ii]

RESULTS

Descriptive Overview

Table 2 provides a descriptive overview of the dependent and country-level variables. Respondents in Chile report the highest work-family conflict followed by individuals from the post-communist bloc (Bulgaria, Slovakia, Poland, Russia and Hungary). The post-communist bloc reflects a legacy of long work hour requirements with limited policy support (Panayotova & Brayfield, 1997) which may partially explain their high rates of work-family conflict. By contrast, respondents in Switzerland, Japan and Austria report the least work-family conflict yet a clear pattern does not emerge for these low work-family conflict countries. For family-work conflict, the Latin-American countries (Chile, Brazil and Mexico) report the highest conflict. Consistent with reports for work-family conflict, respondents in Switzerland, Japan and Austria report the least family-work conflict suggesting that on average respondents in these countries experience less conflict between work and family.

At the country-level, the Nordic countries report the highest and Russia the lowest female parliamentary representation. Belgium has the highest percentage of children in public childcare and Cyprus the lowest. Chile reports the longest mean full-time weekly work hours and Austria the shortest. Cyprus has the highest full-time maternal labor force participation when children are under school aged and the Netherlands the lowest. The Netherlands is characterized by a strong cultural preference for mothers to work part-time when children are young which is reflected in these numbers (Treas & Widmer, 2000). While the distribution of countries across these measures does reflect some patterns - the Nordic, post-communist and Latin countries cluster on

some of the measures - many of the countries range in their distribution across these measures indicating that these are capturing variation across multiple country characteristics.

Multi-Level Results

Table 3 presents the individual-level HLM results for family-work and work-family conflict. Models 1 and 4 address the first research question: does family-work and work-family conflict vary for this cross-national sample? The significant results indicate that respondents report different levels of family-work and work-family conflict in the sampled countries. Models 2 and 5 introduce the gender and parenthood measures to test for a gender and parenthood conflict gap. Consistent with expectations, women and parents report significantly more family-work and work-family conflict. However, this effect may reflect the distribution of individual demands and resources and/or gender differences in parental status. To address these relationships, models 3 and 6 include gender interaction terms for parental status and individual-level demands, resources and demographic controls. I expected parents to shoulder a disproportionate share of family-work and work-family conflict but this relationship may vary by gender. Indeed, the results indicate that while the presence of a child under five is associated with more family-work conflict for both parents, this positive effect is more than doubled for mothers of a young child net of individual controls (model 3). What is more, the positive effect for having a child six to seventeen in the home is significant for mothers but not for fathers. In other words, the presence of a child six to seventeen in the home has differential effects by gender with only mothers experiencing greater family-work conflict. Collectively, these results suggest that mothers experience a greater family-work conflict burden for children of any age yet fathers only experience greater conflict when children are young.

For work-family conflict, a different pattern emerges. Specifically, the presence of a child under five and six to seventeen are positive and significant net of individual controls. However, the gender interaction term for the presence of a child under five is negative and significant for mothers. In other words, fathers report more but mothers less work-family conflict associated with having a young child in the home. It is important to note, however, that mothers still report more work-family conflict than do fathers net of this negative coefficient as the gender gap is positive and large (mother's work-family conflict=0.122 +0.095 -0.092=0.125; father's work-family conflict=0.095). Thus, mothers experience a slightly smaller work-family penalty from a young child but this effect does not compensate for the large positive gender effect. For children six to seventeen, the gender interaction term is non-significant indicating that school aged children make both parents equally vulnerable to work-family conflict. From table 3, two relationships are robust net of controls: (1) women report significantly more family-work and work-family conflict net of parental status and individual controls; (2) parents of a child under five have significantly different conflict patterns than parents of an older child and childless respondents. From these models, the question remains: do macro-level labor markets and policy environments structure the gaps in conflict for women and parents of a young child?

Table 5 addresses these relationships by introducing macro-level measures for the overall population (intercept), women (gender gap) and parents of a young child (parenthood gap). Model 1 introduces two measures expected to affect workers' family-work conflict regardless of gender and parental status: the percent of female parliamentarians and mean full-time weekly work hours. Counter to expectations, neither of these measures is significant for any of these groups. Models 2 and 3 add two measures expected to have distinct effects for parents of a young child: the percent of children in publically funded childcare and maternal full-time employment.

For simplicity, the tables do not present the non-significant results at the intercept and for women but all models control for the full set of macro-level measures. Model 2 adds the percent of children in publically funded childcare which is negative for mothers' family-work conflict. In other words, mothers report less family-work conflict in countries with more expansive public childcare. Once childcare is included in the model, mean weekly work hours becomes positive and significant at the intercept indicating that respondents in countries with longer mean work weeks report more family-work conflict, net of gender and parental status. Model 3 adds the percent of mothers of young children working full-time which is not significant but the negative effect of childcare for mothers and work hours for the overall population are robust net of macro-level controls.

Models 4 through 6 parallel the family-work conflict models. Model 4 presents the results for female parliamentarians and mean full-time weekly work hours. Consistent with expectations, the percent of female parliamentarians is negatively associated with men and women's work-family conflict but has a bigger negative effect on men's work-family conflict than on women's (men= -0.007; women= -0.007+0.004= -0.003). I expected respondents in countries with longer weekly work hours to report more work-family conflict, a relationship supported for women and fathers of a young child. For mothers, however, macro-level mean work hours are negatively associated with their work-family conflict. Model 5 adds the childcare measure for parents which is not significant; however, with the inclusion of the childcare measure, the mean full-time weekly work hour effects become non-significant for parents. This suggests that long weekly work hours are not detrimental to fathers' work-family conflict when coupled with more expansive public childcare. Indeed, in models not shown, the significant relationship between mean full-time weekly work hours and work-family conflict disappears

once the childcare measure is included whether female parliamentarians are included in the model or not. This suggests that the presence of more expansive childcare buffers parents from the deleterious effects of long weekly work hours on work-family conflict.

Model 6 includes the percent of mothers of a young child working full-time which is not significant. However, once this measure is included, the percent of women in parliament becomes negatively associated with mothers' work-family conflict. What is more, the female parliamentarian effects are robust at the intercept and the gender gap. This suggests that living in a country in which more women are politically empowered has strong ameliorating effects on work-family conflict. I expected that the Nordic countries - reflecting the highest female parliamentary representation - to be driving this effect. In models not shown, I included a dummy measure for the Nordic countries at the intercept and for the cross-level effects. From these models, two patterns emerge: first, the effect for female parliamentarians is robust at the intercept and the gender gap indicating that female parliamentarians have a strong effect on work-family conflict beyond the Nordic bloc; second, the negative effect for mothers of a young child disappears demonstrating that this effect is absorbed by this Nordic distinction rather than being tied to high parliamentarian countries. In sum, individuals, regardless of parental status, report less work-family conflict in countries where more women are politically empowered. What is more, this effect is significant net of family-responsive policy, work structure and Nordic welfare states.

DISCUSSION

This study investigated family-work and work-family conflict in a multi-level perspective and produced two main findings. First, the gender and parenthood (young child present) gaps

remained net of individual-level controls and country-level policy and labor market structure. This indicates that women and parents of a young child are vulnerable to conflict between work and family and that this conflict is not completely alleviated by individual and structural resources. Second, the macro-level measures of policy (childcare enrollment and female parliamentary representation) and participation (percent of mothers' of a young child working full-time and mean full-time weekly work hours) structure family-work and work-family conflict in distinct ways by gender and parenthood status. These results are discussed in more detail below.

The analyses identify large and robust gender and parenthood effects for family-work and work-family conflict. This result is not novel and is demonstrated in previous research (Crompton & Lyonette, 2006; Glavin et al., 2011; Hill, 2005; Nomaguchi, 2009). However, this study identifies a gender and parenthood effect net of individual-level controls *and* country-level policy and participation measures. This indicates that net of individual and structural resources, gender and parenthood disadvantages remain. This suggests that providing parents with publically funded childcare and increasing women's parliamentary representation are not sufficient to create work-life balance. Some of the country-level measures do alleviate some strain for certain populations. Specifically, mothers of a young child report less family-work conflict in countries with more children enrolled in public childcare. Further, fathers report more and mothers less work-family conflict in countries with longer mean full-time weekly work hours; however, this effect becomes non-significant net of public childcare enrollment. This suggests that mothers may reduce their work hours in countries where mean work hours are longer and childcare is not available. This is supported by the negative coefficients for mothers of a young child at the individual level *and* mean weekly work hours at the country level. Once

public childcare is included, however, both of these effects become non-significant. This suggests that providing more expansive childcare protects parents from deleterious effects of long weekly work hours and may encourage continuous maternal labor force participation. At the demographic level, Gornick and Meyers (2003) support this claim. This research indicates that public childcare benefits employed parents directly in terms of work-family and family-work conflict.

I expected two measures – mean full-time weekly work hours and female parliamentary representation – to structure all employees' conflict. The results demonstrate specific effects by population. Mean full-time weekly work hours are positively associated with family-work conflict for all employees regardless of gender and parenthood status. This suggests that individuals in countries with longer normative work weeks experience a greater time squeeze on their family demands, net of individual-level work hours. By contrast, only women report greater work-family conflict associated with longer mean weekly work hours. Given women's disproportionate responsibility for family demands (Coltrane, 2001), longer normative work hours may increase women's demands in the work domain without reducing demands at home. By extension, women may feel pressure balancing both responsibilities and thus report more conflict in both directions. What is more, these relationships remain net country-level measures of gender empowerment (female parliamentary representation) and family-responsive policy (childcare enrollment). Further, this greater work-family and family-work conflict may have negative consequences on working women's health and well-being in countries with longer work hours. Future research should pay close attention to these relationships.

In addition to work structure, female parliamentary representation had strong effects on work-family conflict. Specifically, individuals living in countries with a higher percentage of

female parliamentarians report significantly less work-family conflict, a negative effect that is bigger for men than women. This is noteworthy as this relationship remains significant net of mothers' labor market participation, family-responsive benefits, and living in a Nordic country. In other words, women's political power at the country level has a distinct effect on work-family conflict above and beyond individual resources and family-responsive policies. Similarly, this effect is not driven by the Nordic countries characterized by high female parliamentarian representation. Previous research finds female parliamentarian representation highly correlated with overall gender empowerment at the country level (Ruppanner, 2010). In this context, female parliamentarian representation may measure broader gender empowerment, a status that facilitates work-life balance net of family responsive policies, work structure and individual-level resources. What is more, this is not merely a Nordic effect reflecting countries with historical legacies of gender empowerment and high female parliamentarian representation, but an effect that a holds net of the Nordic effect. Given emerging democracies' institutionalization of quota policies for women's parliamentarian representation, the results of this study suggest that increasing women's political representation may have broad beneficial effects on work-family conflict for all workers.

This study is not without limitations. First, individuals with the most conflict between work and family at most likely to drop out a labor market indicating a selectivity bias, a limitation discussed in previous research (Schieman et al., 2009). This selection effect would underestimate the frequency and the volume of reported conflict thus underestimating the dependent measures. Second, the country level measures may inaccurately estimate the macro cultural features. While I have modeled theoretically driven relationships, the independent country level measures may tap into additional unmeasured country level characteristics. Further,

while I expect female parliamentarian representation to capture gender and family-responsive policies, modeling specific policies including affirmative action policies may provide a more nuanced understanding of the findings.

Ultimately, however, the results are clear. Women and parents of a young child report more family-work and work-family conflict net of individual and country-level controls. Second, macro-level policy and participation structure conflict between work and family. Future research should explore these relationships for strategically selected countries and with longitudinal data to make concrete policy recommendations.

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Table 1: Correlations for Country-Level Measures

	Women's parliamentarian representation (%)	**Mean full-time weekly work hours**	**Public childcare (%)**	**Mothers' (child under 5) full-time employment (%)**
Women's parliamentarian representation (%)	1	-.0429*	0.408*	-0.050
Mean full-time weekly work hours	-0.429*	1	-0.338	-0.432*
Public childcare (%)	0.408*	-0.338	1	0.210
Mothers' (child under 5) full-time employment (%)	-0.050	-.0432*	0.210	1

Note: * indicates significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Table 2: Country-Specific Descriptive Statistics (2002 ISSP)

Country	N for Work-Family and Family-Work Interference Respectively	Mean Work-Family Interference	Mean Family-Work Interference	Women's parliamentarian representation (%)	Public childcare (%)	Mothers of young children working full-time (%)	Mean work hours (full-time)
Australia	686, 690	2.29	1.55	26.5	0.03	16	42.2
Austria	877, 900	1.85	1.18	25.1	0.36	45	39.0
Belgium	681, 692	2.30	1.34	24.9	0.96	39	43.1
Brazil	761, 766	2.51	1.90	6.7	0.09	28	44.9
Chile	692, 699	2.76	2.30	10.1	0.07	21	53.4
Cyprus	698, 698	2.17	1.56	10.7	0.00	82	41.2
Czech Republic	325, 326	2.31	1.51	14.2	0.40	26	44.7
Denmark	790, 793	2.15	1.17	38.0	0.90	67	40.5
East Germany	190, 195	2.13	1.20	31.0	0.81	27	45.6
Finland	637, 646	2.10	1.32	36.5	0.48	42	39.3
France	1061, 1082	2.33	1.45	10.9	0.83	45	40.3
Great Britain	967, 1009	2.30	1.46	17.1	0.31	24	44.3
Hungary	385, 388	2.52	1.40	8.3	0.30	23	46.8
Israel	660, 627	2.53	1.71	13.3	0.75	37	44.7
Japan	554, 564	1.85	1.17	10.0	0.01	16	49.6
Latvia	613, 613	2.38	1.42	17.0	0.43	40	44.4
Mexico	714, 727	2.37	2.01	15.9	0.40	19	50.1
Netherlands	665, 695	2.12	1.34	32.9	0.39	4	40.7
North Ireland	402, 422	2.13	1.41	13.7	0.31	20	41.5
Norway	855, 861	2.21	1.27	36.4	0.56	45	42.6
Poland	506, 507	2.59	1.71	20.7	0.10	26	46.8
Portugal	497, 515	2.31	1.54	18.7	0.14	54	42.5
Russia	855, 889	2.54	1.42	6.4	0.38	37	44.1
Slovenia	478, 493	2.34	1.32	12.2	0.64	55	44.0
Slovakia	625, 625	2.66	1.70	14.0	0.58	44	44.0
Spain	1094, 1101	2.30	1.51	26.6	0.24	26	43.7
Sweden	648, 664	2.24	1.35	42.7	0.84	26	41.8
Switzerland	565, 590	1.77	1.13	22.4	0.52	6	45.8
United States	704, 723	2.33	1.56	13.8	0.14	33	46.0
West Germany	417, 430	2.24	1.33	31.0	0.31	13	44.4

2002 ISSP data. Individuals nested in 29 countries.

Table 3. Hierarchical Linear Model for Family-Work and Work-Family Interference (2002 ISSP)

	Family-Work Conflict			Work-Family Conflict		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Variable	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**
Intercept	1.488 ***	1.381 ***	1.434 ***	2.308 ***	2.230 ***	2.183 ***
Main Independent Variables						
Female (value =1)	---	0.133 ***	0.049 **	---	0.073 ***	0.122 ***
Female x Child 5 and under present	---	---	0.074 **	---	---	-0.092 *
Child 5 and under present (value=1)	---	0.091 ***	0.040 *	---	0.093 ***	0.095 ***
Female x Child 6 to 17 present	---	---	0.055 *	---	---	-0.035
Child 6 to 17 present (value=1)	---	0.064 ***	0.019	---	0.060 ***	0.045 *
Demands						
Home stress	---	---	0.037 ***	---	---	0.015 *
Home pressure	---	---	0.092 ***	---	---	0.140 ***
Home dissatisfaction	---	---	0.078 ***	---	---	0.078 ***
Attitudinal Support for Housework Equality (value=1)	---	---	0.029 *	---	---	0.053 **
Weekly work hours	---	---	0.002 **	---	---	0.010 **
Job stress	---	---	0.005	---	---	0.088 **
Job dissatisfaction	---	---	0.048 ***	---	---	0.078 ***
Job pressure	---	---	0.064 ***	---	---	0.168 ***
Resources	---	---		---	---	
Partner Present			-0.006			0.029
Professional position (value =1)	---	---	0.005	---	---	-0.015
Supervisor (value=1)	---	---	0.004	---	---	0.059 ***
College degree (value =1)	---	---	-0.019	---	---	0.037 *
Household earnings scale	---	---	-0.104 ***	---	---	-0.013
Controls						
Age			0.002			-0.004
Age Squared	---	---	-0.00002	---		0.00003
VARIANCE COMPONENTS						
Intercept	0.069 ***	0.066 ***	0.057 ***	0.044 ***	0.042 ***	0.030 ***
Level-1	0.394	0.387	0.343	0.726	0.722	0.554

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 2002 ISSP data for individuals nested in 29 countries

Table 4. Macro-Level Results for Hierarchical Linear Models of Family-Work and Work-Family Interference (2002 ISSP)

	Family-Work Interference			Work-Family Interference		
	Model 1	**Model 2**	**Model 3**	**Model 4**	**Model 5**	**Model 6**
	Coeff.	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**	**Coeff.**
Intercept	**1.434** ***	**1.434** ***	**1.434** ***	**2.178** ***	**2.179** ***	**2.179** ***
Women's parliamentarian representation (%)	-0.005	-0.005	-0.005	**-0.007** **	**-0.007** *	**-0.007** **
Mean full-time weekly work hours	0.033	**0.033** **	**0.033** **	0.006	0.006	0.006
Female	**0.053** ***	**0.054** ***	**0.054** ***	**0.126** ***	**0.125** ***	**0.125** ***
Women's parliamentarian representation (%)	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	**0.004** *	**0.004** *	**0.004** **
Mean Full-Time Weekly Work Hours	0.005	0.005	0.005	**0.013** **	**0.013** *	**0.013** *
Child under five present	**0.042** *	**0.042** ***	**0.040** *	**0.090** ***	**0.089** ***	**0.088** ***
Women's parliamentarian representation (%)	0.001	0.0004	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.003
Mean full-time weekly work hours	-0.004	-0.003	-0.001	**0.021** **	0.019	0.025
Public childcare (%)	---	0.039	0.031	---	-0.112	-0.131
Mothers' (child under 5) full-time employment (%)	---	---	0.001	---	---	0.002
Female x child under five present	**0.075** **	**0.078** **	**0.080** ***	**-0.074** ***	-0.073	-0.0709
Women's parliamentarian representation (%)	-0.002	-0.001	-0.001	-0.008	-0.009	**-0.011** *
Mean full-time weekly work hours	0.0003	-0.004	-0.008	**-0.027** *	-0.009	-0.030
Public childcare (%)	---	**-0.205** *	**-0.194** *	---	0.182	0.204
Mothers' (child under 5) full-time employment (%)	---	---	-0.001	---	-0.022	-0.002
VARIANCE COMPONENTS						
Intercept	0.036 ***	0.037 ***	0.037 ***	0.024 ***	0.024 ***	0.024 ***
Female slope	0.005 ***	0.005 ***	0.005 ***	0.003	0.003 ***	0.003
Child under five present slope	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.015 **	0.016 **	0.016 **
Female x child under five present slope	0.003	0.002	0.002	0.025 *	0.028 *	0.027 *
Level-1 R	0.341	0.341	0.341	0.550	0.550	0.550

Note: *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001 (two-tailed tests). 2002 ISSP data. Individuals nested in 29 countries. Models include all individual-level controls. Models include macro-level measures public childcare and mothers' full-time employment at the intercept and the gender slope which are non-significant and thus not presented.

[i] One approach to this research question is to test a series of policy measures. However, this imposes important limitations: (1) the data quality of policy measures is limited or unavailable for the 29 sampled countries; (2) the small degrees of freedom at the macro-level (29 countries) methodologically limits the number of macro-level measures included in this study; (3) female parliamentarians capture some of this variation in public policies but also the broader cultural environment of gender equality. Indeed, Ruppanner (2010) finds female parliamentarians to be highly correlated with overall measures of gender empowerment. For these reasons, I have chosen to model female representation rather than a series of policies.

[ii] I also explored categorical measures for age consistent with previous research (Schieman et al. 2009) but the categorical results produced equivalent (non-significant) results to the linear and squared age measures.